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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis will focus on contempt of court law under the English Legal system and in 
particular, on potentially prejudicial or impeding publications and their effect on the ability to 
have a fair trial. As Lord Diplock remarked: ‘Trial by newspaper or, as it should be more 
compendiously expressed today, trial by the media, is not to be permitted in this country’.1 It 
will be assessed, primarily focusing on Article 6 and Article 10, as to whether the current 
system can be said to be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights
2
 and 
Strasbourg’s jurisprudence. It will be questioned whether, even if such compatibility is found; 
whether contempt law is continuing to fulfil its underlying purposes. Consequently, it will 
look at the potential for reform in this area; and will consider whether the most likely and 
satisfactory mechanism for change would arise in the form of abolition, new parliamentary 
legislation and/or via the Courts using s.2, s.3 and s.6 of the Human Rights Act
3
 to reshape 
the current laws. 
 
Models 
As Brandwood has explained, three theoretical models can be identified which form the basis 
of contempt of court law.
4
  To fully understand and appreciate the legal approach, it must be 
fully understood what the underlying aims are, which can be done by acknowledging the 
theoretical basis it is founded upon. Therefore, details of the preventative model, the 
protective model and the neutralising model will now be explored. From this the thesis will 
                                                          
1
 Attorney General v English [1983] A.C. 116. 
2
 European Convention on Human Rights (1951). 
3
 Human Rights Act (1998). 
4
 J. Armstrong Brandwood, “You say ‘Fair Trial’ and I say ‘Free Press’: British and American 
approaches to protecting defendants’ rights in high profile trials” [2000] 75 NYLR 1412. 
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identify the most effective model, and shape the critiques of the current law and proposed 
recommendations from this approach. 
 
Preventative Model 
Within the preventative model the state seeks to prevent material being promulgated which 
will affect the fairness of proceedings; prior restraints are used to do this.
5
 Thus, this model 
relies heavily on intervention by the state, which is done through injunctions or court orders 
preventing specific publications before they have been published and imparted to the public. 
Consequently, it has the potential to fail to protect the media’s Article 10 rights and to 
overprotect the court proceedings. As a result this creates an environment which could cause 
a chilling effect on the media, as publishers will be afraid to attempt to publish anything that 
may be censored by the state. Therefore, this would be seen as a clear violation of Article 10 
ECHR, as the freedom of the press is viewed as a necessary pillar for upholding a democratic 
society,
6
  a sentiment which was similarly stated in Sunday Times v UK
7
 where the court 
remarked – ‘freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a 
democratic society’. For that reason, any preventative approaches to the media could quash 
their ability to impart information and ideas, which the public have a right to receive.
8
 As 
such, this model must be limited in its usage, as the total ban on any publication is a strong 
interference with Article 10 and would need to be shown to strongly meet the Article 10(2) 
exceptions. 
 
                                                          
5
 H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (2006, OUP) pp175-
176. 
6
 Jersild v Denmark (Application no. 15890/89) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG , 23 September 1994. 
7
 [1979] 2 EHRR 245 at 280. 
8
 Ibid. 
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However, Fenwick and Phillipson’s analysis of this approach fails to mention the potential 
merit in this model, as if the regulations are very precise, prior restraints can be more 
effective than broad post-publication sanctions under the protective model.
9
 This model is 
used widely across Europe and some elements can be seen in the current English law.
10
 
Nevertheless, the scope of this approach is too restrictive to Article 10 and would unlikely 
meet the proportionality threshold in the majority of cases; thus, basing the contempt law 
fundamentally on a preventive basis would not be the best approach for ensuring free speech 
within a democratic society. Therefore, other approaches must be more heavily relied on. 
 
The Protective Model 
The protective model uses post-publication sanctions under the law of contempt to protect the 
administration of justice from media-created prejudice.
11
 It is meant to act as a deterrent so 
that the media can report on proceedings, but in a non-prejudicial way. The law does not look 
at whether prejudice has in fact arisen; instead it relies on the trial judge to ensure the fairness 
of proceedings. The model leaves the media to publish whatever they want to on the 
proceedings; thus unlike the preventative model there is no strong reliance on prior restraints 
by the state. However they are at risk of attracting post-publication sanctions if they meet the 
relevant tests prescribed under the jurisdiction in question.  
 
Nevertheless, although a more media-friendly method of upholding Article 10 rights than 
under the preventive approach, the test can under-protect the judicial process. If the tests 
create a very high test to prove prejudice, then it is unlikely to act as a deterrent, which is the 
                                                          
9
 See I. Cram, “Automatic reporting restrictions in criminal proceedings and Article 10 of the ECHR” 
(1998) EHRLR 742. 
10
  Ibid. 
11
 Fenwick, n.5 above, p176-177. 
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very fundamental problem affecting the function of this model. Therefore, trials can in fact be 
prejudiced, which would mean the trial judges themselves would have to initiate neutralising 
measures to attempt to negate the effect of the prejudicial publications, which themselves can 
cause an impediment to the justice system.
12
 If a trial appears to have been affected by such 
publications, this can be the foundation for a successful appeal.
13
 Nevertheless, the effect of 
the publications can leave a (factually) guilty person free and an innocent in prison until such 
an appeal has been launched; in addition, a successful appeal is unlikely to deter the media 
from publishing prejudicial material in the future. There is an unpredictable nature to the use 
of the protective model, as it can under-protect trials and free speech, depending on the 
situation and outcome, which is only further enhanced if the media fails to use its freedom 
under this model to enhance fairness in trials.
14
  
 
Conversely, the model has the ability to create a chilling effect on the media, if the scope of 
the law is left ambiguous and too far reaching, as this would supress the media through fear 
of any publication attracting criminal liability. In this instance, the protective model can be 
seen to merge with the preventative model and there distinction left unclear, as broad post 
publication sanctions would stifle media bodies and prevent them from publishing any 
material. Consequently, in instances where the preventative and protective models seemingly 
merge the approaches are weakened, ineffective and would be incompatible with the ECHR 
Article 10. Thus, for the protective model to be effective, the law must be clear and 
                                                          
12
 D. Corker & M. Levi, “Pre-trial Publicity and its Treatment in the English Courts” [1996] Crim LR 
622. 
13
 Taylor (1993) 98 Cr App R 361 (CA). 
14
 T.M. Honess, “Empirical and Legal Perspectives on the Impact of Pre-Trial Publicity” [2002] Crim 
LR 719. 
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proportional, so as to be distinct from the preventive model, by not creating a chilling effect 
on the media. 
 
Nonetheless, this model does have the potential to be the most effective model, as it 
fundamentally seeks to strike a fair balance between the two competing rights of free speech 
and a fair trial, which cannot be said for the other two approaches. Furthermore, Fenwick and 
Phillipson’s analysis of this model supports the effective usage of this protective approach in 
conjunction with smaller elements from the preventative and neutralising models, which this 
work will be forwarding as the most workable solution. 
 
The Neutralising Model 
The Neutralising Model aims at dealing with prejudicial material by using measures to ensure 
the impartiality of the jury.
15
 Therefore, the model does not seek to censor, restrain or deter 
the media from publishing anything about the trial, instead in strongly upholds the notion of 
‘open judicial proceedings’. 16  Measures under the neutralising model to ensure fairness 
include: strong directions to the jury, jury challenges to select out of the panel those affected, 
changing the trial venue, stays and sequestration of jury. Final resorts could include acquittal 
or abandonment.
17
 Thus, this approach can be seen as extremely Article 10 friendly, as the 
media is not deterred from publishing anything, nor are prior restraints used; consequently, 
the press is completely free to publish about the trial without any restrictions. 
 
                                                          
15
 Fenwick, n.5 above, p177-178. 
16
 I. Cram, ‘Automatic reporting restrictions in criminal proceedings and Article 10 of the ECHR’ 
(1998) EHLR 742, p. 750. 
17
 I. Cram, “Automatic Reporting Restrictions in Criminal Proceedings and Article 10 of the ECHR” 
[1998] EHRLR 742. 
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However, as Fenwick and Phillipson accurately note, such measures do not necessarily 
ensure the fairness of a trial and can be argued to be in fact counter-productive in ensuring 
the administration of justice (as will be discussed later on in this work when analysing the US 
approach).  Furthermore, this model’s strong focus on ensuring the freedom of media means 
that it fails to truly protect trials; consequently, it does not strike the right balance between 
the two competing interests. This is in stark contrast to the protective approach, which seeks 
to strike a fair balance between the two competing interests.  The US adoption of this model 
has lead to some catastrophic miscarriages of justice, as was seen in the notable OJ Simpson 
case
18
 (a critique of this case and the US approach is discussed later on in this work). 
 
As has been illustrated there is no perfect model which can be used to develop contempt of 
court law. However, as has been discussed above and supported by Fenwick and Phillipson, 
the protective approach comes closest to ensuring that the two main competing rights of 
freedom of expression and a right to a fair trial are both weighed up against each other 
equally. Therefore, this thesis will be critiquing contempt of law from the view point that the 
protective model is the most preferable approach to be taken under English law. Nevertheless, 
it must be noted, that the work does not view the protective approach as what contempt laws 
should be conclusively based on. Instead, it will endorse the broader all-encompassing 
approaching that Fenwick and Phillipson support, as the protective approach must be 
strengthened by using some of the neutralising and preventive approaches. Nonetheless, the 
fundamental approach for contempt law should be the protective approach, which will be 
argued throughout this work 
 
                                                          
18
 M. Chesterman, “OJ and the Dingo: How media publicity for criminal jury trials is dealt with in 
Australia and America” (1997) 45 AM Jo Comp Law 109. 
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Research Questions 
The broad overarching questions which will drive this work will be: 
How does the law in England currently deal with prejudicial publications and their impact on 
the fair trial process? 
How have these law developed and been implemented in recent history? 
How far can it be said that the current law is compatible with the ECHR and Strasbourg 
jurisprudence? 
What is the theoretical basis of the English approach? 
What theoretical basis or mixture of bases, would underpin an effective contempt law?  
How does this basis differ from other jurisdictions’ approaches? 
How does the Law Commission view the current situation? 
What can be done to improve the current law as it stands, taking account of the preferred 
theoretical model put forward in the thesis, and what is the most likely (and effective) form of 
action that will be taken? 
 
Route Map of Chapters 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
Chapter 2: Overview of the current law. 
Chapter 3: The US approach 
Chapter 4: ‘Substantial Risk’ 
Chapter 5: ‘Seriously Prejudiced’ and The use of ‘Impeded’ 
Chapter 6: The use of s.5 (A discussion in good faith of public affairs) 
Chapter 7: Common Law Contempt 
Chapter 8: The future of English Contempt of Court Law 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
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Methodology 
Primarily the research will take the form of a close doctrinal analysis and comparison of 
related case law under English, Strasbourg and other ECHR nations’ jurisprudence. Related 
case law in this area will include: contempt of court case law, Article 6 case law, Article 10 
case law and case law which has a focus on new internet-based media, such as Facebook and 
Twitter. 
 
The work will also conduct a comparison to other jurisdictions outside the ECHR system, 
taking a strong look at the US approach; as mentioned earlier this takes a strong neutralising 
approach. From this, assess what the English legal system can learn and adopt from this 
approach, as well as assessing the likelihood of whether this approach would be deemed 
compatible with the ECHR. 
 
Finally, it will take an in depth look at the Law Commission’s recent consultation paper into 
this area, the first of these reports was released at the end of October 2013.
19
 From this the 
thesis will evaluate and critique the solutions they offer to the problems they have identified. 
It will assess what theoretical basis they are taking with their proposed reform, and how 
effective this is likely to be. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/consultations/contempt.htm accessed 12th October 2013. 
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Chapter 2: Overview of the current law. 
Prior to the 1981 legislation in this area of law, under R v Bolam
20
 creating a real risk of 
prejudice (or prejudging proceedings) was sufficient to be found in contempt. However, the 
decision by the European Court of Human Rights in Sunday Times v UK
21
 acted as a catalyst 
for new legislation, as it was asserted that more protection needed to be given to Article 10 
rights: due to the potentially ‘chilling effect’ the law at the time placed on the media, and the 
need for a proportionality test. 
 
Under the recommendations of The Phillimore Committee,
22
 the 1981 Contempt of Court Act 
was enacted, which is the current legislation governing this area (when the publication 
happens during the active period). Nevertheless, it is important to note that a narrow body of 
the common law actions for contempt of court are still an alternative to the statute in certain 
situations (which will be discussed later on). Four key aspects to note from the legislation are: 
It is an offence of strict liability (Section 1); there must be a publication (Section 2(1)); the 
publication must be released in the active period (Section 2(3)), which is defined in Schedule 
1; and finally the material must create a substantial risk that the course of justice in the 
proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced (Section 2(2)). In regards to 
this final point, it is important to note that in AG v News Group Newspapers
23
 it was stated 
that these were two separate components separately assessed; thus, the court must assess the 
substantial risk and serious impediment or prejudice components separately. 
 
                                                          
20
 (1949) 93 Solicitors Journal 220. 
21
 (1979) 2 EHRR 245. 
22
 Report of the Committee on Contempt of Court (1974) Cmnd 5794. 
23
 (1988) 3 WLR 163. 
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Early case law in this area gave a very broad reading to Section 2(2), as AG v English
24
 
established that only risks which were remote would not be covered by the legislation. 
However, in the run up to the Human Rights Act 1998, which gave further effect in English 
law to the European Convention on Human Rights, there was a raising of the standard that 
needed to be met. In relation to the substantial risk element (AG v MGN)
25
 the decision in 
MGN took account of the need to look at individual stories from individual newspapers and 
not to take into regard the blanket effect the media coverage could have had on the course of 
justice, while also emphasising the important effect of neutralising instructions from the 
judge and a juror’s ability to focus on the actual evidence of the case. It also placed a strong 
emphasis on the ‘fade factor’ element which was further explained in AG v Unger26 as the 
concept that media which may cause serious prejudice but a substantial risk may not be 
established due to the length of time between publication and the trial. Furthermore, jurors 
will read the coverage as part of an ‘everyday media diet’ which means it is unlikely to 
remain in their memory while they are still ignorant of the fact that they will be jurors in the 
relevant trial; hence, for the coverage to create a ‘substantial risk’ of serious prejudice it must 
in general arise during or just before the proceedings.  
 
AG v Guardian
27
 took this test even further as the publication was not deemed (by a very 
small margin) to create a substantial risk in this case even though it came out during the trial, 
due to the neutralising instructions of the judge and the fact that an appeal would be unlikely 
to succeed. This was similarly followed in Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd
28
 in 
                                                          
24
 (1983) 1 AC 116. 
25
  (1997) 1 All ER 456. 
26
 (1998) 1 CR App R 308. 
27
 (1999) EMLR 904. 
28
 [2012] EWHC 3195 (admin); [2013] ACD 42. 
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which considerable weight was given to the ‘fade factor’ argument and the effect of the 
judge’s neutralising instructions being able focus the jurors on the evidence in hand. However, 
Attorney General v MGN Limited, News Group Newspapers Limited
29
 used ‘impediment’ as 
a way of bringing an action under Section 2(2), as the publications created a substantial risk 
of serious impediment to the proceedings. Thus, this finding created a means of avoiding the 
problem of the ‘fade factor’ barrier by arguing that the publications impeded the collection of 
key evidence from witnesses and the clearing of any suspicion on other key suspects. 
Therefore, it did not need to show that the publication would have a prejudicial potential 
effect on the case, just that the active period from arrest to charging the suspect was affected 
by the publications. 
 
However, Strasbourg jurisprudence in this area refers to a ‘more likely than not test’ from 
Worm v Austria.
30
 Similarly, the recent decision in AG v MGN and News Group 
Newspapers
31
 criticised the decision in Guardian for drawing the law too close to the 
standard required for a criminal appeal and stated a need for a return to the Unger standard. 
The ECHR has been very strong in its protection of Article 6; as Cram has noted that ‘it ranks 
among the most fundamental guarantees for the individual in a democratic society’.32 This 
view is supported in the jurisprudence, as a fair trial ‘holds so prominent a place in a 
democratic society that there can be no justification for interpreting Article 6(1) of the 
convention restrictively.’33 Furthermore, the Commission before its removal used to take a 
very strict stance to the power of external publication influencing lay jurors when they had to 
                                                          
29
 [2011] EWHC 2074 (Admin) [2011] EWHC 2074 (Admin). 
30
 (1997) 25 EHRR 557. 
31
 [2011] EWHC 2074. 
32
 I Cram, Borrie & Lowe: The Law of Contempt  (4
th
 edition, 2010, Butterworths London) p.17. 
33
 Moreira de Azevedo v Portugal (1990) 13 EHRR 721, 737. 
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determine issues of guilt and innocence,
34
 as in many cases their decision could lead to the 
restriction of the defendant’s liberty which is heavily protected under Article 5 ECHR. 
Furthermore, the ECtHR has noted that Article 10 will not override Article 6 when the 
publication is likely to prejudice the chances of a fair trial or public confidence in the 
courts.
35
 However, when compared to the US approach, it is clear that the English case law 
adopts a far stricter approach to the media, as it allows intense, exaggerated, biased and over-
hyped material to be published freely.
36
 Nevertheless, this is due to the neutralising approach 
the US takes which allows the media to publish freely without restriction and then uses 
measures to stop the trial from becoming biased.  
 
The second limb of serious impediment and prejudice has proved to be less of a contentious 
area in regards to Convention compliance. Unger made it clear that it must be more than a 
merely trivial claim to create prejudice, as it must be an actual assertion of guilt.  
 
An action under the Act must also show that s.5 does not apply (where s.2(2) is satisfied), 
which is that the publication is ‘a discussion in good faith of public affairs or other matters of 
general public interest’ and ‘is merely incidental to the discussion’. AG v Random House37 
fleshed this out by stating the case in question must be used as a passing example; the article 
must be able to exist without the mention of the case and the article must focus on a non-
trivial public affairs discussion. What the statute or case law fails to do, as all Strasbourg 
                                                          
34
 X v Australia, Coll. 11 (1963) 31, 43; X v Norway Yearbook XIII (1970) 302, 324. 
35
 News Verlags GmbH v Austria (2000) 31 EHRR 246, 9 BHRC 625 ECtHR.  
36
 I. Cram, A Virtue Less Cloistered: Courts, Speech and Constitutions (2002, Hart Publishing) p.95. 
37
 [2009] EWHC 1727. 
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jurisprudence does in the area of Article 10 cases, is take into account the value of the 
speech.
38
 
 
A small section of the old common law contempt remained after the 1981 Contempt of Court 
Act legislation through Section 6(c). To bring an action under this there must be imminence 
(note that the proceedings do not have to be active), specific intention (which is unlike the 
strict liability offence of the Act) and creation of a real risk of prejudice. The meaning of 
imminence in this area of law is anything but clear, as R v Savundranayagan and Walker
39
 
confirmed that proceedings do not need to be active, yet it gave no clear meaning of what 
would count as imminent. AG v News Group Newspapers
40
 added further confusion with 
obiter comments that stated there was no need for imminence if specific intent was 
established. Whereas, in AG v Sports Newspapers Ltd
41
 obiter comments from the judges 
clashed on the issue, as one said that imminence was not necessary while the other said it 
denoted the same period as the active period under the legislation.
42
 Specific intent was 
inferred in News group Newspapers, as the newspaper was funding a private action against a 
defendant about whom it was publishing vilifying news stories. 
 
The creation of a real risk of prejudice has developed into 3 subsections, which Fenwick has 
summed up as including: creating bias, pressuring litigants and frustrating the purpose of an 
injunction. Under the limb of creating bias, News Group Newspaper stands as the leading 
case in this area, which deemed the coverage was creating bias as it was an extremely hard 
                                                          
38
 They should also take into account S.12(4) HRA and S.6 HRA. 
39
 (1986) 3 All ER 641. 
40
 (1988) 3 WLR 163. 
41
 (1992) 1 All ER 503. 
42
 See also: Attorney-General v Punch Ltd and Another |2001| QB 1028. 
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hitting article despite the potential fade factor (it is important to note, that in light of Unger it 
is unclear whether this decision would have the same result today). In AG v Hislop and 
Pressdram Ltd
43
 Private Eye were found to be creating a real risk of prejudice by pressuring a 
litigant through threatening publications who was bringing libel actions against them for past 
defamatory articles. Finally, frustrating the purpose of an injunction has been the most readily 
used limb under the common law contempt of court action. In the Spycatcher case
44
 an 
injunction had been placed on a newspaper from publishing extracts from a banned book; 
however, other newspapers published the extracts, yet this was found to have frustrated the 
injunction and created a real risk of prejudice in future actions. This was similarly followed 
by the House of Lords in the post HRA case of AG v Punch
45
 which only took a very 
superficial look at Articles 6 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
Literature Review 
Literature in regards to the interpretation of Section 2(2) of the contempt of Court Act 1981 is 
vast, and in agreement that there is no rigid and consistent pattern that the Courts have 
followed.
46
 Furthermore, there is a strong suggestion in the literature, as has been particularly 
noted by Cram
47
 that since the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, the English courts 
have raised the bar of contempt too high. This view is similarly supported in the works of 
                                                          
43
 (1991) 1 QB 514. 
44
 AG v Newspaper Publishing Plc (1987) 3 All ER 276. 
45
 (2003) 1 AC 1046. 
46
 Sir John Laws (2000) 116 LQR 157; D Corker and M Levi ‘Pre-trial publicity and its Treatment in 
the English Courts’ (1996) Crim LR 622; C Walker ‘Fundamental Rights, Fair Trials and the Audi-
visual Sector’ (1996) 59 MLR 517; ATH Smith ‘The Press, the Courts and the Constitution’ (1999) 
52 CLP 126. 
47
 I Cram, Borrie & Lowe: The Law of Contempt  (4
th
 edition, 2010, Butterworths London) p.17. 
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both Fenwick
48
 and Phillipson,
49
 as both suggest that the protection afforded to Article 10 
may be too strong. However, there is strong agreement in the literature that the English 
approach is far stricter in its stance towards the media than that which is seen in the US 
approach.
50
 
 
In relation to new media and a need for the law of contempt to catch up with this 
phenomenon, there has been much speculation from commentators. This has been seen in the 
widespread agreement that the law is currently ill-equipped to deal with the current situation:  
Agate,
51
 Spencer,
52
 Kervick,
53
 Fitzpatrick,
54
 Cram and Taylor
55
 have all noted a need for 
reform, as the current approach is unable to appreciate the full force that the internet brings, 
as anybody can publish and the material never fades.
56
 The widespread support for changes 
                                                          
48
 H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (2006, OUP). 
49
 G. Phillipson, “Trial by Media: The Betrayal of the First Amendment’s Purpose” 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1492&context=lcp accessed 28
th
 
November 2013. 
50
 I. Cram, A Virtue Less Cloistered: Courts, Speech and Constitutions (2002, Hart Publishing) p.95. 
51
 Jennifer Agate, “Strict enforcement of strict liability contempt” (2012) Ent. L.R. 12. 
52
 J.R. Spencer, ‘The Law Commission’s consultation paper on contempt of court’ (2013) Crim. L.R. 
1. 
53
 A.Kervick ‘Strict liability contempt in the age of the internet’ (2013) Arch. Rev. 5. 
54
 P. Fitzpatrick, ‘The British Jury: an argument for the reconstruction of the little parliament’ (2010) 
C.S.L.R. 1. 
55
 I.Cram & N. Taylor ‘The Law Commission’s contempt proposals – getting the balance right?’ 
(2013) Crim. L.R. 465. 
56
 See also C. Hunt,  ‘Contempt of court and the internet’, (2012) CLJ 24; K. Crosby, “Controlling 
Devlin’s jury: what the jury thinks, and what the jury sees online” (2012) Crim. L.R. 15; K. Murray, 
“An internet enabled jury of one’s peers” (2012) 17(2) B.R. 32; G. Resta, Trying cases in the Media: 
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led to the Law Commission’s Consultation Papers on the current contempt law,57 which is the 
current leading research in this area, as part of the work was dedicated to the effect of new 
media on contempt law. The work itself admits that there is a lack of empirical evidence into 
the effect that the modern media has on jury members’ ability to remain impartial. 58 
Furthermore, although providing an extensive proposal of reforms, there is currently a lack of 
critique on the Law Commission’s work; although, Cram and Taylor do provide some,59 the 
literature in this area is far from comprehensive as to analysing the feasibility, likelihood and 
Convention-compatibility of the proposals. 
 
Current academic literature has not had a strong focus on the ability of jurors to disregard 
prejudicial material, or their susceptibility to such publications. There is a lack of empirical 
research in this area, as the only main research is the research led by Professor Cheryl 
Thomas, which found that, of those jurors questioned who were sitting in high-profile cases, 
over one-third recalled some of the pre-trial media coverage, whilst one-fifth said they had 
found it hard to put such coverage out of their minds.
60
 It was also noted in the Law 
Commissions recent consultation paper on contempt that some research has also been 
undertaken in other jurisdictions, although it reached conflicting conclusions and also often 
pre-dated the widespread use of the internet and social media (and of course jurors in other 
jurisdictions are differently instructed and restricted in what they can do, and the nature of 
publications also varies between jurisdictions).
61
 However, Arlidge has questioned the need 
                                                          
57
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58
 Ibid, p8. 
59
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60
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for more research in this area, as it has been suggested that courts may be more trusting of 
jurors’ ability to consider only the evidence heard in court, with the “drama of the trial” being 
a factor in focusing jurors’ attention.62  Nonetheless, research conducted into the area of 
neutralising instructions by judges has shown that they do not decrease the likelihood of a 
juror being influenced by the prejudicial material, and in some cases they actually increase 
the likelihood of an unsafe conviction rather than decreasing it.
63
 
 
Literature in regards to the narrow band of common law contempt is unanimously heavily 
critical, as it creates ‘messy’ and uncertain law, which Miller has gone as far to say is 
incompatible with the ECHR.
64
 This is similarly supported in the work of Fenwick and 
Phillipson,
65
 who have both agreed that this area of law may, depending on its aspect and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Say ‘Fair Trial’ and I Say ‘Free Press’: British and American Approaches to Protecting Defendants’ 
Rights in High Profile Trials” (2000) 75 New York University Law Review 1412, 1417 to 1418; W 
Young, N Cameron and Y Tinsley, Law Juries in Criminal Trials, Part Two: A Summary of the 
Research Findings (Law Commission of New Zealand Preliminary Paper 37, Vol 2, 1999) pp 60 to 
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http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/1999/11/Publication_76_159_PP37Vol2.p
df (last visited 1 Nov 2012); E Brickman, J Blackman, R Futterman and J Dinnerstein, “How Juror 
Internet Use Has Changed the American Jury” (2008) 1 Journal of Court Innovation 287, 289 to 291; 
and M Chesterman, J Chan and S Hampton, Managing Prejudicial Publicity: An Empirical Study of 
Criminal Jury Trials in New South Wales (2001), 
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 Arlidge, Eady and Smith on Contempt  Sweet & Maxwell; 4th Revised edition edition (14 Dec 
2011)paras 4-118 and 4-121. 
63
 Tanford, ‘The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions’ 69 (1990) Nebraska Law Review 71. 
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application, create breaches of Article 10. The uncertainty in this law and the need for this to 
be addressed is highlighted in the recent Law Commission consultation Paper.
66
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
66
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Chapter 3: The U.S. approach 
In order to offer a full critique of the current English approach to contempt of court law, it is 
important to appreciate an alternative approach which is not moulded by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. As has been touched on briefly, the U.S. approach adopts a 
neutralising stance which offers a stark contrast to the more protective English model. This 
chapter will lay out the basic principles of the U.S. approach, the reasoning behind it, finally 
highlighting the potential benefits and flaws in the U.S. approach. However, is is important to 
note that some aspects of English law are within this neutralizing model, such as judicial 
directions; nevertheless, contempt law itself is prima facie not within it. 
 
Balancing the 1
st
 and 6
th
 Amendments 
An over-simplified look at the U.S. approach has concluded that ‘the balancing of the right to 
a fair trial and freedom of the press is uncomplicated in the U.S.’.67 This is a result of the fact 
that ‘the need to balance these two fundamental rights means they do not need to conflict’68 
and that it ‘gives both freedoms equal weight’.69 These observations are supported by the fact 
that fair trial guarantees are enshrined in the US Constitution’s Sixth Amendment – ‘In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury’;70 similarly, the First Amendment protects freedom of speech and freedom of 
                                                          
67
 POLIS Report, ‘Forum on Contempt of Court and Media Publicity’, (24 October 2008, LSE). 
68
 Ibid. 
69
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70
 U.S. Const. amend. V ‘Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
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the press – ‘Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press’.71 
Furthermore, the words of Justice Black that ‘free speech and fair trials are two of the most 
cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose between 
them’,72 thus highlighting the strong attempts to make sure both rights are treated equally and 
do not impinge on one another. In addition, the U.S. Constitution does not even acknowledge 
the potential tension between the two rights.
73
 
 
Therefore, it can be ascertained that American law in theory endorses strategies that can 
safeguard both fair trial rights and freedom of the press.
74
 However, this does not seem to be 
the situation in practice, as Furman has noted that when upholding the First Amendment for 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press, the US appears to neglect the right to a fair 
trial.
75
 This suggests that the two rights do not balance equally without one being overridden 
by the other; this is an argument which is supported by Armstrong – ‘American courts often 
fail to protect the rights of criminal defendants against prejudicial media influence’. 76 
However, in other cases the Supreme Court of the U.S. has referred to the Sixth Amendment 
as the ‘most fundamental of all freedoms’,77 thus, illuminating a clear disparity and lack of 
consistency between the way that these two rights are treated. This unacknowledged priority 
                                                          
71
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given to the 1
st
 Amendment is highlighted in the jurisprudence,
78
 where the courts are 
particularly hostile to ‘prior restraints and to any attempts by courts or government authorities 
to dictate the content of media publications’.79 This was similarly seen in Near v Minnesota80 
where the courts showed a strong commitment to the First Amendment and treated any 
restraints on the media with special hostility. Consequently, as Chesterman notes – ‘Just as 
the media may not be made criminally or civilly liable… so too they may not be restrained in 
advance from publishing such material’.81 Therefore, this sustains Barendt’s assertion that the 
‘courts in the United States adopt a radically different approach, apparently denying that the 
conflict of values is as acute as it appears’.82 
 
Heavy reliance on the Neutralising model 
The lack of a protective approach to dealing with pre-trial prejudicial publications is claimed 
by Brandwood to be due to ‘large scepticism over the actual effect of pre-trial publicity on 
jurors in the U.S.’,83 thus, causing trial judges to underrate the potential effects of pretrial 
publicity.
84
 Furthermore, studies have shown that despite strong social evidence conducted 
                                                          
78
 See: Chesterman, ‘OJ and the Dingo: How media publicity for criminal jury trials is dealt with in 
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 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo 418 US 241 (1974). 
80
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Page 25 of 136 
 
throughout the U.S that is well publicised,
85
 there is a substantial proportion of U.S. judges 
who doubt that publicity can prejudice criminal trials.
86
 Sanford has noted that much of the 
scepticism comes from the deluded belief that neither right infringes on the other, and that 
they must be looked at separately, as ‘many in America remain sceptical that publicity can 
impinge on fair trial rights, as they do not view the two as competing rights’.87 In addition, 
this is bolstered by the fact that mass media coverage before and during trials has often led to 
acquittals and not convictions, as was seen with William Kennedy Smith, Amadou Diallo and 
OJ Simpson.
88
 These acquittals could be the result of a poorly prepared case or a change of 
location, as was seen in the Diallo case. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the media 
coverage still in fact impeded on the proceedings and affected the judicial process, therefore, 
clearly allowing the press to alter the judicial path. 
 
Phillipson has taken this idea further by arguing that the problem is that courts seem presently 
to be ‘blindsided by the dazzle of the open-justice principle; the notion of robust and 
uninhibited reportage on the criminal-justice system carries with it such compelling overtones 
of a high and righteous purpose, that judges seem to shy away from looking more closely at 
the type of prejudicial media expression discussed here and from recognizing it for what it is: 
                                                          
85
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low value speech’.89 Hence, the U.S. appears to put such a strong emphasis on the protection 
of the press as they supposedly keep the trial system open and fair, when in fact it would 
appear that ‘the uses the media makes of its freedom can often directly undermine the values 
underlying the right to free speech itself…foundations of a democratic society’.90 
 
The strong upholding of the First Amendment also stems from the belief that it ‘embodies 
more than a commitment to free expression and communicative interchange for their own 
sakes; it has a structured role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-
government’91 Thus, forwarding the idea of democratic self-government, as to have a truly 
free and democratic society there must be a completely open arena for ideas to be shared. 
However, this does fail to acknowledge the possibility that publications can start to become 
detrimental and repressive on the ability to uphold this truly democratic society. Nonetheless, 
as Cram has noted it still remains that the ‘essential purpose of the first Amendment is to 
allow citizens to exercise informed political choices and thus participate in societal decision-
making process’.92 This is most aptly explained by The Justice Department as a ‘vital public 
interest in open judicial proceedings’,93 yet the US system clearly fails to acknowledge that 
this unhindered approach can become detrimental to the judicial process. 
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The relaxed approach to curbing prejudicial pre-trial material in the U.S. has led to some 
catastrophic miscarriages of justice. In Sheppard v Maxwell
94
 the press saturated the 
community with highly inflammatory, inaccurate, and inadmissible information; furthermore, 
at times they were directing the police in their investigation. The decision was only 
overturned after the defendant had spent a decade in prison, having lost his family, medical 
license and way of life; he died 4 years after being released. Similarly, Louise Woodward, a 
young British au pair living in Massachusetts, was charged with murdering the baby she had 
been hired to care for; many in England felt that the overwhelming publicity surrounding the 
case made a fair trial all but impossible.
95
 Sengupta referred to the media in this matter as a 
separate, parallel public trial with material which would have been considered grossly 
prejudicial in Britain.
96
 Similarly Cruddace was critical of the fact that her verdict ‘could be 
decided by 30 minutes of prime time television’.97 Ms. Woodward was eventually set free as 
the result of an extraordinary intervention by the trial judge; to English critics the fact 
remains that a seemingly innocent girl was convicted after a trial which, by English standards, 
was irreparably tainted by unrestricted publicity.
98
 Therefore, Hoge’s sentiments appear 
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completely apt, that ‘The more you see of these trials, they show you what a shambles the 
American criminal justice system is’.99 
 
In an attempt to curb the unhindered media ‘The U.S. adopts a neutralising approach to 
prejudicial publicity by: controlling the atmosphere of the courtroom, insulating witnesses 
from publicity, controlling leaks from law enforcement personnel, changing the venue, 
granting a continuance, and sequestering the jury’.100 This neutralising approach is upheld in 
the U.S. as it does ‘not require interferences with free speech in the media; using such 
methods protects both rights and is therefore the plainly preferable approach’.101 However, as 
Phillipson points out, this argument depends ‘upon it being clear that those other methods do 
reliably safeguard fair trials’.102 Levi similarly notes that this approach relies on selecting a 
‘jury panel of anyone who seems to have paid the remotest attention to the world around 
them’,103 which is surely not a desirable situation; additionally, ‘is that it is difficult for 
anyone – legal professional or lay person – to assess bias accurately’, which could lead to a 
biased juror being allowed to serve in the trial.
104
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Furthermore, the law appears to be extremely unclear, as in Murphy v Florida
105
 the Supreme 
Court set an extremely high threshold for challenging a trial judge's assessment of the 
detrimental effects of pretrial publicity, adopting a "totality of the circumstances" test that it 
did not fully explain.
106
 The result is extremely confusing, as trial courts are encouraged to 
deploy protective mechanisms when publicity is reasonably likely to prevent a fair trial, but 
higher courts will only reverse trial court decisions if publicity has rendered a fair trial 
virtually impossible. Thus, it can be seen that the Supreme Court is willing to grant a wide 
discretion to trial courts in assessing the potentially prejudicial publicity,
107
 which it must be 
argued, clearly fails to properly safeguard Sixth Amendment rights. Furthermore, in 
Pennekamp v Florida the contempt findings on a publication of cartoons and comments 
aimed at pending rape proceedings were deemed unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.
108
 This decision stemmed from the extremely high threshold test that ‘the 
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high’.109 
 
Therefore these decisions support Brandwood’s conclusion that ‘because of unrestrained 
publicity, certain criminal defendants simply do not receive fair trials in U.S. courts’.110 As a 
consequence, the ‘American media, being effectively free of restraints… regularly give so 
much wide-ranging publicity to cases that they believe will attract high public interest that 
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concerns about the fairness of the trial are much more often provoked’.111 Consequently, on 
average there are over 300 reported incidents a year, of lawyers raising concerns over the 
fairness of the trial due to pre-trial publicity;
112
 thus, it must be concluded that ‘the freedom 
allowed to the media in America is much wider that this watchdog role requires’.113 
 
Nonetheless, the US judiciary still uphold  this rigorous approach on the strong belief that 
‘freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile’.114 
However, the aforementioned examples have clearly highlighted that a wholly unregulated 
media is in fact self-deprecating on the upholding of this ideal; thus, some regulation may be 
needed to truly achieve a society that is informed, open and democratic. Nevertheless, it is 
important to achieve balance in the approach taken, as if s.2(2) is applied to liberally under 
domestic law it has the ability to create a chilling effect on the media and silence them 
entirely, through fear of criminal liability. Thus, the approach taken to the application of s.2(2) 
must ensure that it achieves the right balance, and that the regulations placed on the media are 
not too stringent so as to avoid a chilling effect, yet not too relaxed so as to reflect the far too 
open US approach. 
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The rise of the internet under the US approach 
Further criticism has been levelled at the US’s neutralising approach in light of the internet 
revolution, as ‘the explosive growth of social networking has placed enormous pressure on 
one of the most fundamental of American institutions - the impartial jury’.115 Hence, any 
potential juror has ‘access to information on a scale never before seen in human history’; thus, 
the completely unrestrained US media is available to any internet enabled juror at any 
moment in the build-up or during the trial. Furthermore, ‘the rise of web-based social 
networking services has wreaked havoc in the jury box’,116 as jurors… all use social media… 
to research and prepare their case’. 117 This position clearly flies in the face of the long 
standing principle of impartiality
118
 held in U.S. jurisprudence that ‘conclusions to be reached 
in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any 
outside influence, whether of private talk or public print’.119  
 
Consequently, there is a ‘large chance of encountering information and comment outside the 
evidence in the trial which could prejudice their decision’.120 Accordingly, Barns has noted 
‘there is the element of social media. Facebook, Twitter and various other forms of social 
media are places where high-profile defendants in criminal trials, particularly involving 
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allegations of sexual assault against children, often have their reputations trashed well before 
there is any finding of guilt made by a court’.121 As such, the neutralising measures taken by 
the Courts are stretched even further in an attempt to stem the wave of potential bias from the 
internet.  60 percent of judges rely on strong neutralising instructions (CACM Model)
122
  to 
deter jurors from using the internet and social media; however, most notably, six percent of 
judges have not addressed the issue at all.
123
 The judges also use threats of contempt 
proceedings for any of those in breach of the CACM model guidelines.
124
 However, research 
has suggested that ‘social media instructions effectively mitigate the risk of juror misconduct 
associated with social media’.125 The study found that of 140 jurors interviewed not a single 
juror actually used social media to research the cases as a result of the judge’s instructions to 
not do so.
126
 Nevertheless, their written responses were extremely defensive, as they wrote: 
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‘NOTHING’ and ‘NO, NEVER’,127 which could in fact suggest that misconduct had occurred, 
but there was a fear of contempt proceedings if they admitted to it. Thus, the research cannot 
be said to be conclusive either way; consequently ‘it is time for appeal courts to look again at 
whether a person can really get a fair trial in the age of media saturation’ when relying on 
purely neutralising measures under the U.S. approach.
128
 
 
From the above discussion it can be seen that the U.S. upholds a strong belief in the separate 
and equal protection of both the free media and the right to fair trial. However, it fails to 
acknowledge that either should ever be impeded in an attempt to uphold the more vital right 
on the facts of the case; thus, this position clearly differs from that taken by the ECHR which 
states that Article 10 is a qualified right and Article 6 is a near-absolute right. The U.S. adopts 
a neutralising approach to safeguard both rights, rather than any preventative or protective 
approaches; although in theory it can be seen as desirable, left on its own it has allowed for 
some very concerning miscarriages of justice. From looking at the U.S. approach it is clear 
that a mere neutralising model would not be a sufficient safeguard for the English law to 
adopt, as Wilson put it – ‘the OJ Simpson fiasco of more recent times – few would wish to 
see justice conducted and corrupted – in the same manner in this country’.129  However, 
elements of this model may be beneficial, as they would stop a protective approach from 
becoming too far reaching and preventative in nature by creating a chilling effect on the 
media. This approach will be explored and promoted as the most suitable option throughout 
this work. 
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Chapter 4: Substantial Risk 
This chapter will be examining the term ‘substantial risk’ as used in s. 2(2) of the Contempt 
of Court Act 1981. It will first look at its initial interpretation by the courts; yet, in the lead up, 
inception and usage of the Human Rights Act 1998 the meaning was distorted into creating a 
much stricter test. That therefore, created an ambiguity surrounding its meaning and usage, 
which led to the English model moving away from a protective approach and towards an over 
usage of the measures based on the neutralising model. Furthermore, it will be argued that the 
English law is now in the ironic position of having gone too far in its attempts to rectify the 
ECtHR’s decision in Sunday Times, as it clearly does not match the approaches taken in 
ECtHR jurisprudence. The chapter will then examine empirical research that has been done 
regarding pre-trial publicity, which will show that a lot of the arguments supporting the 
current English approach are based on judicial myths and do not match the results of the 
research. Additionally, attention will be paid to ‘modern social media’ and how it has 
impacted on the meaning and usage of ‘substantial risk’, and yet its effects have not been 
satisfactorily dealt with by the English judiciary or parliament. Finally, it will explore the 
potential for reforming and modifying the meaning of ‘substantial risk’, so that it can be ‘fit 
for purpose’. 
 
English Case Law: inconsistencies and the inception of the Human Rights Act. 
In contrast to the US’s neutralising approach (as discussed in the previous chapter) the 
English system is prima facie based on the protective approach, since ‘although valuing free 
speech as a vital aspect of a healthy democracy and an important individual right, the English 
courts and Parliament have made it clear that such freedom does not extend to the prejudicing 
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of trials’,130 as ‘trial by newspaper is wrong and should be prevented’.131 However, in order 
for such publications to be prosecuted they must meet the tests laid out in s. 2 of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981 (which this work has already conducted a brief overview of). It 
is important to note again that under s. 2(2) both limbs of the test have to be looked at 
separately and both must be fulfilled. s. 2(2) will not be satisfied if there was a slight risk of 
serious prejudice or a substantial risk of slight prejudice.
132
 Thus, ‘substantial risk’ must be 
assessed separately from serious prejudice or impediment.  Despite an apparently clear piece 
of legislation with separate tests to be met, there is a great deal of tension caused and (as will 
be seen) inconsistent applications. Cram argues that this is as a result of the fact that it 
attempts to reconcile two sometimes conflicting sets of interests, namely those concerned 
with the unimpeded functioning of the judicial system (including the right of the defendants 
to enjoy a fair trial) on the one hand and those of the general public in learning through the 
media about court proceedings.
133
 This tension is most aptly shown when looking at the 
interpretation and usage of the ‘substantial risk’ test. 
 
There is a strong academic support for the argument that the judicial interpretation of 
‘substantial risk’ has been ambiguous and inconsistent.134 The lack of clarity is argued to 
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have been caused in the legislative stage; as Fenwick notes ‘the word "substantial" has 
perhaps introduced unnecessary ambiguity’.135  This assertion can be sustained due to its 
rather late inclusion, as the word ‘substantial’ was introduced at the Bill’s committee stage by 
Lord Elwyn-Jones, despite Lord Hailsham’s arguments that the addition of ‘substantial’ 
added nothing, and the amendment was passed without opposition.
136
 Cram similarly 
critiques the lack of clarity caused by the inclusion of ‘substantial’, as ‘does the word 
substantial add to the degree of risk required’?137 This has led to Feldman claiming that ‘the 
terms in which this section is couched are vague and may be interpreted either expansively or 
narrowly’.138 
 
Consequently, the case law has been inconsistent when setting the standard that must be met. 
Initially, the early case of A-G v English
139
stated that ‘substantial risk’ is excluding a risk 
which is only remote; thus, this would appear to be a fairly low standard that had to be met. 
This was followed by other similar interpretations that substantial means ‘not remote’ or ‘not 
insubstantial’ and the risk must be practical rather than theoretical;140 similarly, the risk must 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
visual Sector’ (1996) 59 MLR 517; ATH Smith ‘The Press, the Courts and the Constitution’ (1999) 
52 CLP 126. However, see D. Goldberg, G. Sutter & I. Walden, Media Law and Practice OUP (2009) 
at 98: which argues that the act did bring some clarity to certain areas, as ‘its most immediate practical 
benefit was a better definition of when and how the publication contempt risk began’. 
135
 H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (2006, OUP) p259. 
136
 Hansard: (HL), vol 416, col 182 (January 15, 1981). 
137
 Cram IG; Taylor NW (2013) “"The Law Commission's Contempt proposals - getting the balance 
right?”, Criminal Law Review. 2013.6: 465-482. p 469. 
138
 D. Feldman, Civil Liberties in England and Wales 2
nd
 edn (2002) OUP, p. 982. 
139
 [1983] 1 AC 116. 
140
 A-G v English [1983] 1 AC 116, 141 to 142; A-G v News Group Newspapers Plc [1987] QB  1, 
15; A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 3) [1992] 1 WLR 874, 881; A-G v British  Broadcasting 
Corporation [1997] Entertainment and Media Law Reports 76, 80. 
Page 37 of 136 
 
be ‘neither remote nor theoretical’.141 Although similar in meaning, these terms are all rather 
nebulous and do not have a clear cut meaning, which as a result can cause vastly different 
interpretations. Nonetheless, ‘for a period during the 1990s, some judges were receptive to 
complaints of prejudice and were persuaded that a fair trial was no longer possible’.142 
 
The judiciary attempted to add further clarity to the vague terms and interpretations 
surrounding ‘substantial risk’ when Schiemann L.J. provided practical guidance on what the 
relevant factors might be.
143
 He laid out ten key principles for assessing the tests under s. 
2(2);
144
 unfortunately, he merely reinstated the nebulous notion in the legislation that the ‘risk’ 
must be ‘substantial’, although it did offer some areas which would be assessed when 
deciding if it met this test. These included: the likelihood of the publication coming to the 
attention of the juror, the likely impact on the reader and the residual impact on the juror 
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come the trial. However, what the guidelines fail to do is suggest whether these are equal 
considerations which must be met to the same equally high standards, or if one of these must 
be prioritised above the others; therefore his tests clearly allowed a lot of room for judicial 
discretion and inconsistencies. The recent Law Commission Consultation Paper has 
concluded that ‘The courts’ interpretation of this has been less than helpful’; 145 this clearly 
supports the reasoning that the terms are far too ambiguous and open to judicial discretion. 
 
However, it must be noted that the case law is seemingly clear on its interpretation as to the 
likelihood of whether the publication would come to the attention of the juror. In A-G v 
Hislop and Pressdram
146
 circulation viewing figures were found to be a relevant factor in 
determining substantial risk; furthermore, it was stated that it does not need to be a mass 
national circulation, a large readership in the area where the case will be held is sufficient. 
Additionally, the fact that no juror actually saw the material does not mean that no juror 
might have done, although the reaction of a juror who sees a publication may be relevant.
147
 
Therefore, it can be seen that judicial comment on the likelihood and the impact is fairly clear 
and straight forward; however, this is due to far greater weight being given to the residual 
impact, as these other factors are merely ‘relevant’148 and not a determining factor. 
 
Fenwick notes that ‘the key factor in determining the substantial risk of serious prejudice is 
that of proximity in time between publication and proceedings’;149 hence, Schiemann L.J.’s 
ten principles are clearly not all of equal weight, as far greater judicial attention and debate is 
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gifted to the residual impact. Which is not without good reason, as Arlidge notes that 
‘naturally, a long gap between publication and an anticipated trial date may significantly 
reduce any risk of contamination’.150 In A-G v News Group Newspapers151 the judge made it 
clear that the proximity of the article to the trial is highly relevant; consequently, 10 months 
was deemed so long that jurors would have either forgotten it or it would have faded to 
insignificance. Therefore, it can be ascertained that a gap between the publication and the 
trial would negate the ‘risk’ from being ‘substantial’; however no accurate guidance was 
given as to what length of time would be short enough to reach the standard of ‘substantial’. 
Similarly, in A-G v Independent TV News and Others
152
 the risk that any juror would 
remember the material in question was not ‘substantial’ due to the 9 month gap before the 
trial. However,  in  A-G v Hislop and Pressdram,
153
 a gap of three months was not deemed 
long enough to negate the risk;
154
 thus, could it be ascertained that a ‘substantial risk’ could 
potentially be created if the trial was less than half a year away, when considering these 
cases?
155
 
 
The rather uncertain test was only muddled further in light of the Human Rights Act 1998, as 
it brought the ECHR into domestic law, which meant, as the Law Commission has noted, that 
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‘consideration of s. 2(2) requires account to be taken of Article 10’.156 Thus, this led to a 
much more media-friendly approach, as ‘In the late 1990s judges began to show a readiness 
to assume that somewhat smaller time lapses would still diminish the risk in question to the 
point where it could be viewed as negligible or minimal’.157 Consequently, the case law 
shows ‘a largely unacknowledged rise in the weight to be attributed to the term substantial’, 
which can ‘be traced to a group of cases decided at around the time of the inception of the 
HRA’.158 This is similarly supported by Cram who argues that ‘the enactment of the HRA in 
the interim has seen a subtly different approach taken by the courts—one that is certainly 
more publication friendly—but this has not been clearly expressed in the cases’.159 
 
Raising the bar to merge with criminal appeals 
The rising standard for that of meeting the ‘substantial risk’ test has been created by an even 
greater ‘emphasis on the fade factor’,160 as ‘time lapses that will tend to be viewed as too 
significant to allow a finding of substantial risk to be made appear to be getting shorter’.161 In 
A-G v MGN articles published three and a half months before trial with a large circulation 
were deemed not to meet the required threshold. The judges looked at their impact at the time 
of the publication and then at the time of the trial, thus stressing the importance of taking into 
accounts the residual impact on jurors. Consequently, they decided that the impact would 
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have faded due to the ‘fade factor’. 162  Thus, a similar length of time between trial and 
publication with that of Hislop was deemed not to aid in creating a ‘substantial risk’; thus, the 
rising of the bar can clearly be seen. 
 
In A-G v Unger
163
  the publication made a clear implication of guilt (impact), but when 
considering the ‘crucial’ matter of the residual impact of the publication on a notional juror at 
the time of publication a great deal of importance was placed on the ‘fade factor’. The judges 
stated that a nine months gap between publication and trial would greatly diminish the 
recollections of any juror who read it. They went on to say, that publications are much more 
dangerous when published contemporaneously with the trial, because then the jurors read 
them with ‘particular interest rather than merely as part of an everyday diet’. 164 Furthermore, 
they stressed that the ‘fade factor’ was a well-established concept in the case law.165 Thus, 
there was clearly a heavy reliance on the ‘fade factor’ for denying that the ‘substantial risk’ 
test had been met, which in turn raised the bar that bit higher. Additionally, Simon Brown 
LJ’s obiter comments marked a potential further rise in the ‘substantial risk’ test, as he stated: 
‘It seems to me important that the courts do not speak with two voices, one used to dismiss 
criminal appeals with the court roundly rejecting any suggestion that prejudice resulted from 
media publications, the other holding comparable publications to be in contempt’.166 Hence, 
this highlights judicial support for contempt law to be bought in line with that of a criminal 
appeal, which is a far higher standard that was initially envisaged by the legislators. 
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However, the ‘substantial risk’ test is one that can be still met, as was seen in A-G v 
Newgroup Newspapers.
167
 The Sun published serious allegations about the defendant as the 
jury were retiring to decide their verdict; consequently, the murder charge was dropped and 
The Sun was prosecuted for contempt. This is a clear cut example of contempt by publication 
and a strong example of ‘tabloid newspapers’ using ‘sensationalist and frequently misleading 
reporting as a marketing tool’.168 However, this is a fine example of the level that would need 
to be met if Simon Brown LJ’s obiter comments were to be absorbed into the judicial 
approach for ‘substantial risk’, creating a level which is clearly too high and misleading. 
Consequently, this would reduce the effectiveness of the protective model, as there would be 
little deterrent, which would place the law in a neutralising approach. 
 
This misleading rising of the bar continued in A-G v Guardian Newspapers,
169
 where The 
Observer published the headline - “This bust was cast from a decaying corpse. Whose work 
does it most resemble: Damien Hirst's or Jeffrey Dahmer's?” while the trial was still in 
progress. The headline clearly had a strong impact on the reader by asserting guilt and the 
‘fade factor’ argument was not relevant, as it happened during the trial; thus, one could 
assume the ‘substantial risk’ test would be easily met. However, the inconsistencies 
continued, as Collins LJ stated that ‘to establish contempt it needs only to be shown that there 
was a substantial risk that serious prejudice, which must in my view mean such prejudice as 
would justify a stay or appeal against conviction’; additionally, he alluded to the importance 
of upholding Article 10 - ‘in applying s. 2(2) due weight must be given to the protection of 
freedom of speech’.170 Thus, it was decided that the test for ‘substantial risk’ had not been 
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met, as Sedley LJ concluded ‘I doubt whether an appeal would have been allowed had the 
jury which convicted Mr Kelly read the article.’ Therefore, this test raised the test for 
substantial risk to a new high, as not even a prejudicial article during a trial would be 
sufficient to give rise to a s. 2(2) action, thus, seemingly making the law virtually redundant. 
Furthermore, ‘The stance undermines the role that s 2(2) seemed to be intended to have – that 
of setting the threshold before that stage would be likely to be reached, thus protecting the 
criminal justice system.’171 Moreover, it is highly questionable that this blatant sensationalist 
and prejudicial publication should have been afforded the strong weighting of Article 10 
when it potentially undermines Article 6, 
 
This imprecise standard has been observed by Fenwick, as she notes that ‘there has been 
uncertainty as to the relationship between s 2(2) and the tests used to make good an appeal 
against conviction or to found a stay’172 This is upheld when compared to the remarks of 
Simon Brown LJ in A-G v Birmingham Post and Mail,
173
 as he stated that ‘s. 2(2) postulates a 
lesser degree of prejudice than is required to make good an appeal against conviction. 
Similarly, it seems to me to postulate a lesser degree of prejudice than would justify an order 
for a stay.’ Additionally, he concluded that ‘In short, s 2(2) is designed to avoid (and where 
necessary punish) publications even if they merely risk prejudicing proceedings, whereas a 
stay will generally only be granted where it is recognised that any subsequent conviction 
would otherwise be imperilled, and a conviction will only be set aside…if it is actually 
unsafe.’ Thus, this highlights a clearly different approach from that in Guardian, as there is a 
clear separation between that of contempt law and that of a criminal appeal; furthermore, it 
shows an inconsistent approach to that of his obiter comments in Unger. 
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The reading down of Guardian’s approach has been similarly followed in Attorney-General v 
Random House Group Ltd and Attorney-General v Associated Newspapers Lt in which 
Moses LJ stated that ‘The statutory question for this court . . . is whether the publication 
created a substantial risk that the course of justice will be substantially impeded or prejudiced. 
It is not the statutory question posed by section 2(1)(a) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, 
namely whether the conviction was unsafe . . . the trust which is placed on juries . . . cannot 
always be relied upon by those whose publications put the prospects of a fair trial at 
substantial risk.’174 Therefore, a clear rejection of the Guardian approach can be read from 
this, as there is a clear separation between the standard needed to reach a ‘substantial risk’ 
and that of a criminal appeal. The removal of any ambiguity in this regard was further aided 
in Attorney General v MGN Ltd and another
175
 when a strong reading down of the Guardian 
approach was given; thus signalling a return to the level stated in Unger.
176
 Even with this 
extremely high bar removed and a return to Unger, ‘the satisfaction of a substantial risk is a 
rather higher threshold than that described in English’,177 due to the heavy reliance on the 
‘fade factor’. Nonetheless, it can be safely assumed that Sedley LJ’s approach in Guardian 
will no longer be treated as authoritative,
178
 which has been further supported by the Law 
Commission, as they noted that: ‘we would consider that it would be a mistake to align the 
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test for whether there has been an abuse of process because of prejudicial media coverage and 
whether there has been a breach of s. 2(2)’.179 
 
Additionally, recent case law may hint to a further weakening of the high substantial risk test; 
however this is yet to be made clear by the judiciary. In Attorney-General v Times 
Newspapers Ltd
180
 the defendant had been charged with murder and attempted murder. Six 
years previously she had pleaded guilty to manslaughter through diminished responsibility 
and was made the subject of a hospital order where she was released after three years. This 
information fuelled a sensationalist publication, as two days after being charged, the 
following headline was run: ‘alleged knife killer stabbed her elderly mother to death’; 
additionally, they gave details of her previous convictions, hospital order and release. The 
newspaper attempted to argue that it could not give rise to a substantial risk of serious 
prejudice as she would have been bound to plead guilty on the grounds of diminished 
responsibility. Nonetheless, the court noted that however hopeless a defence might appear, a 
defendant might ignore advice and plead not guilty. Consequently, it is invariably 
inappropriate for journalists to second guess this.
181
 However, the court was quick to 
remember that if she pleaded not guilty it is likely that the trial would be many months away, 
‘time had an effect on the continuing effect of the articles’.182 Furthermore, the judge noted 
that the article was factual and not so iconic and original in its facts to stand out as ‘uniquely 
memorable to a person’ and that ‘the jury would focus on the evidence and pay heed to the 
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judge’s directions’.183 Therefore, a substantial risk was not shown, which would seem to 
suggest that the bar had not been significantly lowered.  
 
Yet, comments made by the court in Times could suggest a willingness for the bar of 
substantial risk to be lowered, as the judge stated that: ‘the case never acquired the general 
notoriety of (say) the allegations about Mr Christopher Jefferies, the Bristol landlord who was 
subjected to such massive and unfair coverage in connection with the murder of one of his 
tenants in December 2010 (this case’s effect on s. 2(2) will be discussed at length in the next 
chapter); nor, to take an earlier example, of the coverage given to Mr Fagin, the intruder who 
found his way into the Queen's bedroom.
184
 Therefore, this suggests that courts will be far 
more willing to find a substantial risk if the publications are of a similar sensationalist quality 
to those which the court cited. Furthermore, they gave a warning to media bodies by 
declaring that ‘they should exercise great caution... If there is created a substantial risk of 
serious prejudice, the danger is that those most immediately concerned in the case, not only 
any accused person but also the victims and their families, may unnecessarily be deprived of 
access to justice. That should be a danger no editor wants to create.’185 Thus, it can be seen 
that the courts are appearing to suggest that they are going to be more willing to find a 
substantial risk if the right case emerges. Nonetheless, this case only makes an ambiguous 
suggestion of the lowering of the standard, and does not make a clear declaration that the bar 
should be lowered to ensure the effective use of the protective model. 
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An over- reliance on the fade factor 
As Fitzpatrick notes, ‘in determining what is ‘substantial’ the courts have placed great 
emphasis on the ‘fade factor’ and it would seem that the report has to be published 
contemporaneously with trial proceedings to create such a risk’.186 Similarly, Feldman has 
noted how ‘the court has regard to the evanescent quality of most news reports’.187 Corker 
argues this is due to two main judicial misconceptions: firstly, historically, judges have loftily 
dismissed the notion that an English jury might be so susceptible;
 188
 and secondly, they see 
today's newspaper reportage as tomorrow's firelighter.
189
 Consequently, the test for 
‘substantial risk’190  ‘no longer seems capable of being satisfied’, 191  except if during or 
immediately before the trial. Thus, even with the courts returning to the Unger approach
192
 it 
still appears that the level needed to reach ‘substantial risk’ makes the usage and 
effectiveness of contempt law almost redundant within the protective model. 
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Consequently, publications such as those surrounding Rosemary West
193
 and the Abu Hamza 
trial
194
 were adverse to the fairness of the trial, yet resulted in no action from the Attorney 
General – warnings were issued, but no criminal action was brought. The lapse of time allows 
for newspapers to assert guilt in full knowledge that the lapse of time will protect them from 
any contempt action, which undermines the effectiveness of the protective model. This was 
also seen with The Sun’s coverage of the 7/7 bombings in London where the title read ‘Got 
the Bastards’.195 Such aggressive reporting raises the question - should Article 10 be used to 
protect such dangerous expression where it clearly could be infringing on a right to a fair trial? 
This is supported by Fenwick who states that ‘it is questionable whether speech that 
undermines the presumption of innocence has a strong claim to protection’;196 yet, currently 
the English courts appear to fear than any attempt to quash such reporting with the use of 
substantial risk of serious prejudice will be seen as violating Article 10.
197
 
 
Additionally, there is wide spread speculation as to whether the period of time between 
publication and trial will cause a ‘fade factor’. Firstly, it can be argued that ‘once a 
substantial period of time has elapsed, it would be likely that a potential juror would merely 
remember an impression, rather than the specifics of the coverage of any one newspaper. But 
the impression – that the arrestees were guilty – might be deep-rooted and insidious’.198 
Furthermore, ‘some facts are so striking, even when published some time in advance of a 
hearing, as to render it impossible to be confident that the conscientiousness of jurors, or the 
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directions of a trial judge would prevent a substantial risk’.199 Thus, this sustains the idea, that 
if an article is strongly impactful and prejudicial, its lasting impression will bias any potential 
juror regardless of the length of time. Therefore, it must be seen that far too much respect is 
given to a juror’s ability to remain impartial when they have potentially been confronted with 
extremely prejudicial material. It must be seen that The Sunday Mirror’s coverage of the 
Suffolk Ripper, (in which Tom Stephens, was virtually found guilty by the British popular 
press when he was only a police suspect at the time and had not been charged for any 
killings)
200
 is a clear example of the sensationalist journalism which results in a lasting 
impact, leaving an impression which no ‘fade factor’ will diminish; thus, this current 
situation ‘poses an unacceptable level of risk to the system’.201 
 
Cram argues that the case law has resulted in ‘a threshold that lacks precision and can be 
criticised as being both over and under inclusive in the same breath’, 202  as the term 
‘substantial’ as interpreted in English was given a rather weak and over inclusive meaning, 
yet in the face of judicial development it can be seen that ‘the term substantial has been 
afforded de facto greater weight’.203 Furthermore, it could be argued that as the law stands we 
are heading towards the US approach of ‘a completely unregulated media market that would 
render it impossible to empanel a jury of people whose views had not been shaped by matters 
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that are irrelevant to the legal inquiry they need to undertake and that may well predispose 
them to accepting that an accused is guilty’.204 
 
Neutralising approach masquerading as a protective approach 
This argument can be sustained, because as the law stands in England ‘the protective 
approach, sets a high threshold, is unworkably imprecise and is therefore ineffective in 
operation’.205 Thus, it can be seen that the protective model is not actually being used to 
sustain a fair trial, over fears of violating Article 10 (freedom of expression). This fact has 
been observed by Goldberg, as he notes there has been a ‘pronounced decline over the past 
couple of years (of s. 2(2) prosecutions), even in the teeth of some provocative reporting’.206 
Thus, as Smartt puts it ‘Britain seems to be edging towards the American style legal system, 
where freedom to publish takes precedence over all other considerations, and the press can 
put a suspect on trial before he has reached court or a single piece of evidence has been put in 
front of a jury’. 207  Consequently, although ‘the s. 2(2) test can be viewed as taking a 
protective stance since it is intended to deter media bodies from publishing prejudicial 
material’,208 this is not what actually happens in practice due to the standard being set too 
high by the domestic judiciary. 
 
Therefore, the judiciary have paid a lot of attention to the use of neutralising measures, like 
those used in the USA’s neutralising approach to contempt.209 In A-G v Unger210 Simon 
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Brown LJ found that a combination of the ‘fade factor’ coupled with a presumption that 
juries would decide cases solely according to the evidence put before them and would adhere 
to judicial directions they were given, would mean that a substantial risk could not be created.  
Thus, showing the judicial reliance on the neutralising measures as a way of making sure a 
‘substantial risk’ is never created. Similar support was shown in A-G v Guardian 
Newspapers,
211
 as Sedley LJ claimed that it was ‘simply not possible to be sure that the risk 
created by the publication was a substantial risk that a jury, properly directed to disregard its 
own sentiments and any media comment, would nevertheless have its own thoughts or value 
judgements…where they influenced the verdict’.212 Furthermore, in A-G v MGN213 a great 
deal of weight was afforded when looking at substantial risk to the likelihood that the jury 
will be strongly directed to ignore prejudicial coverage of the trial.  
 
Consequently, it would appear that ‘the judiciary has given up attempting to compel the 
media to put their own house in order when reporting big crime stories’;214 thus, although the 
English approach is prima facie based on a primarily protective model, it is strongly 
influenced by the neutralising model. As a result, this only adds further confusion to the 
meaning of ‘substantial risk’, as there is no clear direct judicial acceptance of what are 
acceptable neutralising measures to avoid contempt. Thus, must it be concluded that, what is 
deemed as effective, is purely limited to the judge’s own opinion on neutralising measures, 
which only adds to the ambiguity and inconsistencies surrounding the use of ‘substantial risk’. 
This is seemingly sustained when looking at Lord Phillips obiter remarks in R v Abu 
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Hamza
215
 - ‘the fact, however, that adverse publicity may have risked prejudicing a fair trial 
is no reason for not proceeding… if the judge concludes that with his assistance it will be 
possible to have a fair trial’. Therefore, it can be found that ‘substantial risk’ can be based 
purely on the judge’s discretion as to whether she/he thinks they are able to combat any 
prejudicial contempt with their neutralising instructions. This clearly supports Feldman’s 
conclusion that ‘When assessing whether a publication created a substantial risk of serious 
prejudice the court is prepared to credit jurors with… independence of mind and judgement, 
and with the will and ability to follow judge’s proper direction at the end of a trial, which by 
its nature, focuses the jurors’ attention on the evidence presented in court rather than on 
extraneous publications’.216 Hence, this firmly places contempt law within the neutralising 
model. 
 
Adding to the confusion created when the neutralising approach takes a central role alongside 
the protective model in English contempt law, is the strong disagreement within the judiciary 
surrounding its usage. There are two clear schools of thought as regards the use of 
neutralising measures in relation to a jury: those of juror susceptibility
217
 and juror 
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invulnerability.
218
 Moreover, in A-G v BBC
219
 Staughton LJ expressed the view that he did 
not hold the same confidence as other judges in ‘the ability of jurors to disregard matters 
which they do remember but which they are not entitled to take into account’. To a lesser 
extent, in A-G v Guardian Newspapers
220
 Collins LJ commented that he found it difficult to 
believe that once serious prejudice had arisen that neutralising instructions would be enough 
to dispel the prejudice. Phillipson is similarly in agreement with this judicial doubt, as he 
notes that it would be too great a step to state that juries are able to ignore any pre-trial 
comment such that the law should have no place; furthermore, he finds that an unbiased 
reading of the effectiveness of neutralising measures suggests they do not have the believed 
effect.
221
 
 
In addition to this doubt over the efficacy of neutralising measures, is the strong critique of 
their effect on the English legal system as it stands currently.  Levi has argued that ‘the 
adoption of such measures can create, in itself, unfairness in the system’,222 as the moving 
away from the protective approach ‘allows too much strain to be placed on the criminal 
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justice system…which has to seek to combat the effects of prejudicial publicity by taking 
neutralising measures’.223 Therefore, there has been a clear shift from the protective to the 
neutralising stance; thus, the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which was initially meant to place 
a responsibility on the media, has now placed it on the judges and jury to be neutralized 
rather than protected. Hence, it could be argued that the current approach does not match with 
Article 10 ECHR, in the sense that this right conveys ‘duties and responsibilities’224 upon the 
media; yet the stance taken removes such responsibilities from the media by placing the 
emphasis on a neutralising approach. 
 
 
Compatibility with ECHR jurisprudence 
Cram has rightly observed that ‘since October 2000, the courts as public authorities under the 
Human Rights Act have had to give effect to the provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights whose enumerated rights include the right to a fair trial (art.6), the right to 
respect for private life (art.8) and the right to freedom of expression (art.10)’.225 Furthermore, 
with the use of s. 2 HRA the judiciary is now obliged to take into account any relevant 
Strasbourg jurisprudence; therefore, it is important to assess whether the nebulous and 
inconsistent English law matches that of the ECHR. 
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The domestic courts themselves have held that the current s. 2(2) test ‘falls comfortably 
within the limitations acknowledged in the Convention itself’.226 However, this is grossly 
misleading; as Fenwick has pointed out, there is a ‘difference of emphasis between the 
domestic and Strasbourg tests’ when it comes to assessing ‘substantial risk’.227 Furthermore, 
the s. 2(2) test, on its face, differs from that accepted at Strasbourg in Worm v Austria,
228
 
News Verlags,
229
 and BBC Scotland v UK.
230
 Therefore, this highlights that the English courts 
have been incorrect in their claims that the current law falls comfortably within the 
Convention, as the wording of the law and the case law is clearly not matching that of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, which is strongly relevant under s. 2 HRA. Furthermore, this has 
been endorsed most recently by the Law Commission, as they stated that ‘it is, therefore not 
clear that the degree of risk, and the severity of the impact required under s. 2(2) are currently 
ECHR compliant’.231 
 
In News Verlags
232
 the ECHR were strong in their upholding of Article 6 rights to a fair trial 
through a protective model approach. They stated that ‘the limits of permissible comment on 
pending criminal proceedings may not extend to statements which are likely to prejudice, 
whether intentionally or not, the chances of a person receiving a fair trial or to undermine the 
confidence of the public in the role of the courts in the administration of justice’; 233 
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furthermore, the judges went as far to say that Article 6 is of relevance when balancing up the 
competing interests.
234
 Hence, it can be seen that Strasbourg jurisprudence upholds a strong 
protective model for dealing with prejudicial contempt, as there is a weighty upholding of the 
Article 6 absolute right to a fair trial. 
 
Equally, this is seen in Worm v Austria
235
  in which an article published during the trial 
proceedings that clearly evinced guilt, was held to create prejudice by the Austrian courts. 
The ECtHR held that although there had been an interference with Article 10, they had 
proportionately pursued a legitimate aim by preserving the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.
236
 The decision strongly upheld Article 6 rights, as it proclaimed that ‘Article 6 
reflects the fundamental principle of the rule of law’ and that ‘what is at stake in maintaining 
the impartiality of the judiciary is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society 
must inspire in the accused, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, and also in the 
public at large’.237 Nevertheless, it strongly upheld the principles of Article 10 as well, by 
stating that ‘not only do the media have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the 
public also has a right to receive them’.238 Additionally, the ECtHR took a very reasoned 
approach to pre-trial publications by stating ‘whilst the courts are the forum for the 
determination of a person's guilt or innocence on a criminal charge, this does not mean that 
there can be no prior or contemporaneous discussion of the subject matter of criminal trials 
elsewhere, be it in specialised journals, in the general press or amongst the public at large’.239 
Therefore, this decision confirmed that pre-trial publicity is strongly protected under Article 
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10, as a form of political discussion; thus, a similarity with the English approach can be seen 
here. 
 
However, the harmonisation between the two stops here, as Strasbourg is far more ready to 
use a protective approach in order to uphold Article 6 rights. The Court stated that Article 6 
rights ‘must be borne in mind by journalists when commenting on pending criminal 
proceedings since the limits of permissible comment may not extend to statements which are 
likely to prejudice, whether intentionally or not, the chances of a person receiving a fair trial 
or to undermine the confidence of the public in the role of the courts in the administration of 
criminal justice’.240 Hence, it clearly sets the test as a ‘more likely than not’ test, which prima 
facie is a stricter test than the domestic ‘substantial’ test, as it should only be more than 
insubstantial.  However, as has been seen with the domestic case law, this ‘does not represent 
the current test’,241 due to cases such as Guardian and Unger raising the bar so high, as to go 
far beyond the level intended by the legislators and that of the standard in Worm.
242
 
Consequently the judges have, as argued, made the protective model partly redundant and 
instead have replaced it with a gross over-reliance on a neutralising approach. Thus, the 
English law is now in the ironic situation of having gone too far in its attempts to avoid an 
Article 10 violation, as was seen in Sunday Times  and which spurred the Contempt of Court 
Act 1981. Consequently, the meaning of ‘substantial risk’ needs to be read down, in order to 
be harmonised with the stance of Strasbourg, as currently the ‘law in this area is unclear, 
impractical or at risk of breaching the ECHR’.243 
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Empirical research into pre-trial publicity 
Cram observes in regards to the current English approach – ‘the fade factor coupled with the 
ability of jurors to remain focused on the events before them at trial meant that the "at risk" 
period was in practice concurrent with the trial or its immediate lead in’. 244  Thus, the 
judiciary’s strong belief in the fade factor has pushed the bar for ‘substantial risk’ so high as 
to force the use of a far more neutralising approach than was ever intended by the legislators. 
Furthermore, as Fenwick has noted, ‘UK research into the experiences of actual jurors in the 
jury room is impossible due to the provision of the 1981 Act’;245 hence, there is a strong 
reliance in the effectiveness of neutralising measures without any actual proof. 
 
However, there is empirical research from other jurisdictions which reveals a lot of 
misconceptions the English judiciary has when they assess ‘substantial risk’. A New Zealand 
research project
246
 investigated 48 cases where there had been pre-trial publicity; of those 
cases there was one clear case where pre-trial publicity prejudiced the verdict. More 
strikingly, 19% of jurors recalled seeing some pre-trial publicity; thus, the ‘fade factor’ is 
clearly not as influential as the English judiciary believe it to be. An even more damning 
research project by Chesterman found that exposure to negative publicity tended to produce a 
higher proportion of guilty verdicts.
247
 Furthermore, although neutralising measures were 
used, they did not appear to be successful in preventing prejudice.
248
 Thus, this clearly places 
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an extreme amount of doubt on the current English approach, as both the ‘fade factor’ and 
neutralising measures are shown not to be as robust and effective as the judiciary would seem 
to believe. 
 
Honess has been equally critical of the English approach, as there are no well-established 
criteria that can enable the courts to identify when such opinions make it difficult or 
impossible for the notional juror to “set aside” such prejudices.249 Additionally, he casts 
further doubt over the reliance on the ‘fade factor’, due to it being ‘well recognised that delay 
in a trial (or retrial) will not necessarily be sufficient to eliminate the risk of prejudice’.250 
Moreover, this is similarly supported in New Zealand jurisprudence, as the court in Gisborne 
Herald Co. Ltd v. Solicitor General
251
 forwarded the idea that statements made just after the 
crime are when they will have the most impact, and that although ‘the sheer lapse of time 
may dim memory. But in some cases mud may stick’.252 
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that ‘it would be wrong simply to assume that prejudice will 
necessarily disappear with the lapse of time, the process of the trial or with judicial 
directions’.253 Honess’ research found that any information with a high emotional content is 
far less likely to be forgotten, as it becomes embedded within the juror’s memory in a story 
structure.
254
 Furthermore, when mock jurors were presented with such material; it affected 
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the way they considered evidence and in turn their final verdicts.
255
 This research was 
similarly supported by the findings of Simon, where of 130 people surveyed (two months 
between crime and survey, 25 articles appeared in local newspapers) 59 percent had heard or 
read about the crime, and of this group 65 percent described pro-prosecution feelings when 
asked merely to recall facts.
256
 Additionally, of this group they all expressed concerns that 
they jury would not be in a fair frame of mind, yet rather worryingly, they all stated they 
could hear the case in a fair frame of mind.
257
 Thus, it is clear that the issue of the ‘fade factor’ 
is yet to be satisfactorily resolved, despite what the English judiciary believe and base their 
judgements on. 
 
Furthermore, research by Kerr has shown that ‘common remedies may not be very effective 
in overcoming such bias’;258 thus, ‘extensive prejudicial pre-trial publicity can be associated 
with prejudgement of a defendant’.259 It was shown that there is ‘considerable evidence that 
prejudicial publicity can and does bias verdicts’, as during mock trials exposure to prejudicial 
material let to a 20-40 percent increase in jurors favouring a guilty verdict.
260
 Similarly, Kerr 
found that in cases receiving extensive and intensive pre-trial publicity, where jurors were 
asked the qualification question of - ‘can you, in view of the publicity you have seen, judge 
the defendant in a fair and unbiased manner? Those who answered yes to this question were 
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twice as likely to return a guilty verdict,
261
 thus, clearly throwing doubt on jury integrity.  
Hence, this clearly highlights a lack of ability from the courts to assess whether a juror is 
biased or not, which is supported by a test that Kerr ran, where only 45.4 percent of lawyers 
could correctly assess if a jury member was biased or not.
262
 Additionally, his research 
highlighted, like that of the research already discussed in this section, that ‘instructions to 
disregard such factors as inadmissible or a prior criminal record seem to do little to reduce the 
impact of such extra-legal information’. Consequently, clearly placing doubt on the 
effectiveness of the neutralising model’s ability to ensure a fair trial, as instructions designed 
to reduce bias actually increased it. 263 Similarly, social psychological research indicates that 
telling someone not to think of something may well increase attention to it, 264 which clearly 
negates the purpose of any neutralising judicial measures. 
 
Thomas’ research has also cast doubt on the naïve judicial concept of jury integrity,265 as she 
found that in standard cases five percent of jurors completed their own additional research on 
the trial by looking at past publications, despite the judges neutralising instructions. 
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Additionally, in high profile cases 12 percent of jurors said they had looked for information 
about their case while it was going on. From these results it is also important to consider that 
although all jurors who took part in the study were guaranteed anonymity, it should be borne 
in mind that they were being asked to admit to doing something that they may have 
remembered being told not to do by the judge. As a result the report may have understated the 
numbers of jurors who looked for information during cases. Thus, if a substantial amount of 
jurors are evidently ignoring the judge’s neutralising instructions, it is clear that a stronger 
protective approach needs to be adopted, that does not depend on the ‘fade factor’ pushing 
the bar too high for reaching a ‘substantial risk’. 
 
Modern social Media 
It would be rather an understatement to state that since the Contempt of Court Act 1981 ‘the 
media has changed profoundly’, as ‘there is now widespread access to the internet. 266 
Furthermore, ‘in the internet age, the tension between freedom of expression and the right to 
a fair trial by jury can be acute’;267 thus, the ambiguities, tensions and inconsistencies that 
were already present in contempt law, have only been further exacerbated by the growing use 
of modern media. Yet, with these grave concerns, ‘they have not yet, it seems, taken into 
account of the fact that the use of the internet means that it is much less (publications) 
ephemeral than it used to be’.268 
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The emergence of the internet visibly has a bolstering effect on the ability of a publication to 
pose a ‘substantial risk’, as ‘the existence of the internet clearly increases the circulation 
figures of both newspapers and broadcasts’.269 Additionally, ‘it is clear that the question of 
whether a publication is likely to come to the attention of a juror has changed considerably in 
light of the widespread use of the internet and social networking and the consequent ease and 
speed with which one can search for and disseminate relevant information about cases or 
individuals’.270 Therefore, the likelihood of a juror reading an article, or even noticing the 
developing story on Facebook or Twitter has greatly increased. Additionally, ‘online 
newspapers… are often more expansive than their print equivalents and also encourage 
comment and discussion from all-corners’;271 thus, a potential juror could be met with a 
series of prejudicial comments surrounding the publication, which could just as easily 
influence them as much as the publication itself. Furthermore, Grey has argued that the 
existence of ‘citizen journalism’, which is often sensationalist and prejudicial, has meant the 
regulated media have had to push the boundaries of acceptable reporting in order to remain 
competitive.
272
 This is similarly supported by Cram, who notes that the modern media’s 
selective and sensationalist journalism is causing a much a greater impact on the reader,
273
 
thus, further fulfilling Schieman LJ’s guidelines for ‘substantial risk’. 
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The heavy judicial reliance on the ‘fade factor’, as a way of showing that a substantial risk 
was not present, has to be seriously questioned in light of modern media. The judicial belief 
that publications are gone after a day and start fading in the juror’s memory from then is not 
the case anymore, as no longer is news comment so swiftly outdated but instead forms part of 
an easily searchable database that might more easily produce a jigsaw of prejudicial 
material.
274
 Hence, it must be accepted by the English judiciary that ‘the existence of the 
internet is highly relevant to temporal proximity’;275 consequently, ‘accessibility of the web-
based material, should be taken into account when assessing the risk created by press material 
that has been published some time before the trial’.276 Counter arguments from the judiciary 
suggest that the chance of this is remote, but the rapidly increasing use of the internet is 
negating the existence of such an argument - in 2013, 36 million adults (73 percent) in Great 
Britain accessed the Internet every day.
277
 
 
The negating effect that modern media has had on the ‘fade factor’ is equally sustained by 
Grey, who argues that it must to some extent be undermined by the continuing availability of 
prejudicial material on readily accessible archives.
278
 This approach has been upheld in the 
Scottish courts, as in Scottish HMA v Beggs
279
 they noted that ‘the situation affecting the 
website may be compared with the situation in which a book or other printed material is 
continuously on sale and available to the public. During that whole period, I consider that it 
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would be proper to conclude that that material was being published’.280  This is clearly a far 
more progressive approach to the internet under contempt law than has been seen by any of 
the British judiciary, which is clearly something that needs to be addressed, as ‘information 
on an internet archive was, in effect, continuously republished’. 281   Furthermore, the 
effectiveness and impact of Facebook and Twitter has not been given sufficient consideration 
by the Attorney General or the judiciary. A strong example of this came when, although 
established media did not breach contempt law during the Baby P case, Facebook campaigns 
clearly did, and had 6,600 supporters within the first 48 hours.
282
 Therefore, there is clearly a 
‘pressing issue facing the law of  contempt’,283  as the judiciary need to maintain public 
                                                          
280
 See also: Angus Sinclair v HMA (Scottish) 15 April 2007 [2007] HCJ AC 27, para 14: ‘The 
availability of the internet and its increasingly wide use by members of the public, including potential 
and serving jurors, presents a challenge for the administration of justice. While news reported and 
opinions expressed in the press or broadcasting media on a daily basis are themselves ephemeral, the 
internet provides ready access to historical material, including media items. At one time a person 
seeking reported information about a past event or about a particular individual would require to 
spend significant time, and possibly expense, in retrieving it from a public library or similar 
institution; now such information can be accessed by the pressing at home of a few controls on a 
computer. Moreover, persons with interests in particular fields, including criminal investigations and 
criminal histories, may choose to set up websites which provide links to historical and other 
materials. Such materials, if accessed by a juror or jurors, may in some circumstances be potentially 
highly prejudicial to the fairness of the trial of an accused’. And, Coia v HMA (Scottish) 18 December 
2007, [2007] HCJ 17 IN 219/06 – ‘Innumerable difficulties in connection with controlling 
information accessible on the internet… In our opinion, criminal trials in our jurisdiction are not and 
cannot be concluded in a prophylactic vacuum. They are, and must be, conducted in the real world, of 
which…the internet are parts’. 
281
 D. Goldberg, G. Sutter & I. Walden, Media Law and Practice OUP (2009), p. 144. 
282
 Daily Telegraph Online, 11 August 2009. 
283
 P. Humpherson, ‘Contempt of Court and internet publications – the Law Commission’s 
recommendations and the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill’ (2014) Arch. Rev. 4. 
Page 66 of 136 
 
confidence that jury trials are, and continue to be, conducted on the evidence in the case and 
not by consideration of extraneous material, particularly material available on the internet.’284 
 
Walker has also alluded to another major issue in regards to the internet, which affects the 
approach that needs to be taken towards ‘substantial risk’, as it is ‘fairly accessible for 
internet enabled jurors to search the internet and find old reports relating to the case.’285 
Furthermore, Grey has noted that there is a significant amount of jurors that ‘conduct their 
own web research to aid their decision making, or simply out of curiosity’.286 This was seen 
when a Newcastle juror conducted his own internet research into a case during the trial and 
created a list of 37 additional questions.
287
 Similarly, in Attorney General v Beard & 
Davey,
288
 a juror used social media to research and relay information regarding a case, while 
also seeking opinions from others on Facebook. Therefore showing, that not only are juror’s 
ignoring judge’s neutralising instructions, they are also accessing prejudicial publications 
which had been published long before the trial. Grey finds that this research stems from a fear 
‘of taking on the ultimate responsibility of contributing to a verdict in a difficult- or even not 
so difficult- case’;289 thus, they ‘may be tempted to go to judicially forbidden lengths to 
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bolster their confidence, seeing the internet as a source of impeccable insider information that 
they should exploit in their quest for the truth’.290 
 
This trend has been well documented: a New Zealand Law Commission study conducted in 
1997
291
 found that around 8-15 percent of jurors consulted the internet for additional research 
during trials; furthermore, it is important to remember that these studies were conducted at a 
time when internet usage was a small fraction of what it is today.
292
 Therefore, this clearly 
highlights that the English reliance on jury integrity,
293
 the fade factor and neutralising 
instructions raise the bar for ‘substantial risk’ too far compared to the actual reality. 
Furthermore, Wilson has similarly followed this criticism when looking at the recent MGN 
Jefferies’ case, as ‘it is surprising that the judgement did not consider the effect of the 
Internet. One of the central planks of the publishers’ defence was that the articles would have 
faded from jurors’ memories by the time of the trial. The articles would however still have 
been readily obtainable online’.294 Although the case was able to use serious impediment 
(which will be discussed in the next chapter), the case failed to acknowledge the power of 
online media and its effect on any jury member accessing it, which as has been shown 
frequently happens. 
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Cram has gone as far to say that a preventive and protective approach to new media will 
never work, as ‘in the electronic era of web-based comment uploaded from beyond but 
accessible within the jurisdiction, it could be plausibly argued that attempts to limit media 
speculation in high profile trials such as the Kercher trial are almost certainly doomed to be 
circumvented and law enforcement consequently made to look foolish’.295 Taylor has also 
supported this by referring to the unregulated ‘citizen journalism’ which is selective and 
sensationalist,
296
 as a prejudicial Tweet or Facebook campaign can have just as many viewers 
as a regulated official online published article. Grey further endorses this stance by 
questioning: ‘in an age of Facebook, Twitter and Wikipedia, can legislation still protect the 
accused from publications that create a substantial risk of serious prejudice to the 
proceedings?’297 Therefore, does this leave the law in a situation where the ‘substantial risk’ 
test is no longer needed and the protective approach should be abandoned all together in 
favour of a neutralising approach which looks to combat the prejudice at the trial stage?  
 
This radical abandonment of the protective approach in favour of the neutralising approach 
has been similarly supported by Brandwood, as he concludes that ‘the nature of global media 
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technology undermines even vigorous efforts to contain prejudicial information’.298 Thus, 
with ‘the rise of online media, England likely will have to adopt American-style jury 
controls’; 299  this would include such measures as ‘questioning prospective jurors to 
determine the extent of their exposure’ which ‘could avoid staying prosecutions wherever 
there is widespread exposure by the media of information that would prejudice a criminal 
trial’. 300  Nevertheless, as has already been show, these US neutralising tools are not 
necessarily effective. Furthermore, Grey’s conclusion takes a more measured approach, and 
states that ‘we can control what the traditional press does online, but not what is said about a 
case on Facebook or Twitter’.301 Thus, there is still room in the modern media world for 
lowering the bar and making full use of the ‘substantial risk’ test, accordingly endorsing the 
protective model. Nevertheless, the citizen journalism which comes from Facebook and 
Twitter may need to be dealt with in a more neutralising approach, or with re-defining what 
constitutes a publication in the modern media era. 
 
Reform  
The chapter thus far has highlighted that the law surrounding ‘substantial risk’ is nebulous 
and inconsistent; accordingly, reform of this area is something that should be seriously 
considered. This sentiment is similarly held by Fenwick who notes ‘it is arguable that the 
inefficiency of s. 2(2) considered here…might be addressed to an extent by adopting a 
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change of interpretation under s. 3(1) HRA’.302 However, Taylor has been strong to enforce a 
caution that all reform must be extremely measured, as ‘in the post-Leveson climate, 
justifiable criticism of the excesses of invasive tabloid journalism would align with demands 
for greater restrictions upon media’s ability to comment upon pending court cases. In the face 
of such pressures, it is essential to recall the principled basis of the media’s freedom to 
report’. 303  Nevertheless, as has been seen, there is a strong argument for lowering the 
standard of ‘substantial risk’ so as to harmonise it with ECHR jurisprudence and reinstate the 
protective method in English contempt law. 
 
The Attorney-General has been similarly supportive of re-enforcing the protective method; he 
stated that ‘without the sanction of prosecution the danger is that breaches will occur and in 
turn cause greater disruption to criminal trials. Prosecution does concentrate the mind. As a 
practitioner in the fields of health and safety law it seemed to be effective in raising and 
maintaining standards. I see the sanctions for Contempt of Court in a similar light’.304 Thus, it 
can be inferred that he is calling for a reading down of the ‘substantial risk’ so as to allow for 
more prosecutions, as a way of strengthening the protective model. 
 
The Law Commission has similarly argued that there is a disparity between the English and 
Strasbourg approach and called for a lowering of this standard, as they conclude that ‘any 
degree of prejudice to a fair trial must be prevented’.305 Fenwick in light of Worm has called 
for a reading down and clarifying of the term ‘substantial’ so as to add further certainty to the 
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threshold reached under s. 2(2),
306
 thus, adopting a stance similar to that of a ‘likelier than not 
test’. Confusingly, this would lower the test in practice, yet in terms of wording would 
actually be a literal rising of the standard. Consequently, she has also called for a change in 
the wording, as ‘a "significant" or "real" risk might be more workable’307 and in practice a lot 
clearer. Furthermore, any lowering of the substantial risk test would not be (as the judiciary 
appear to fear) a violation of Article 10, as although it would weaken the standard it would 
not reach the levels of those criticised in Sunday Times; it would merely be in accordance 
with Strasbourg jurisprudence. This development could be achieved by a s. 3 HRA 
interpretation by the courts, so as to harmonise the two approaches, which in turn would 
reinstate the stronger protective approach. However, this is unlikely given that any change is 
now likely to come as a result of the Law Commission proposals through parliamentary 
legislation. Furthermore, the courts have appeared to show a willingness to lower the bar in 
the most recent cases of MGN and Times,  although still ambiguous as to what extent they are 
willing to lower it, support from the Law Commission would help to endorse this lowering by 
the judiciary. 
 
Smartt has taken the radical stance that in light of modern media’s effect on the substantial 
risk test that ‘the Contempt of Court Act 1981, be done away with, since this statute was 
being shamelessly ignored’.308 Although modern media does pose a large risk to the use and 
meaning of ‘substantial risk’, as ‘what is clear is the motion of publication contempt will 
have to adapt or die in the teeth or the… internet’;309 a far more measured approach can be 
                                                          
306
 H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (2006, OUP)  p.277. 
307
 Ibid, p278. 
308
 U. Smartt, ‘Who Still Observes the Law of Contempt?’ (2007) 171 JPN 76. 
309
 D. Goldberg, G. Sutter & I. Walden, Media Law and Practice OUP (2009), p147. 
Page 72 of 136 
 
seen in New Zealand case law. In Police v PIK
310
  the Court acknowledged that ‘Once 
information is available on the internet it is potentially there indefinitely. Information takes 
on a viral quality. It has a tendency to spread’. However, injunctions could be placed on said 
material, or removed from the internet so as not to cause prejudice to any jurors who attempt 
to search for material during the trials. This practical approach has been similarly endorsed 
by Bell; as she explained ‘the prosecution carry out internet searches; if prejudicial material 
was identified, the prosecution should request that the Australian website remove it until the 
trial was over’.311 Therefore, this would help decrease the chance of the internet removing 
any potential fade factor on earlier prejudicial publications which were published outside of 
the ‘at risk’ period.  
 
The Law Commission have appeared to potentially support such an approach, as they state 
that ‘section 2(3) of the 1981 Act should be amended, the courts be provided with a power to 
make an order when proceedings are active to remove temporarily an identified publication 
that was first published before proceedings became active. The power would only be 
available where the publication creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the 
proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced. Such an order would be 
capable of being made against any person who is a publisher within the meaning of the 1981 
Act and a failure to comply with such an order expeditiously without reasonable excuse 
                                                          
310
 Youth Court, Manukau [2008] DCR 853; 2008 NZDCR Lexis 39, 25 and 26 August 2008 (New 
Zealand). 
311
 ‘How to Preserve the Integrity of Jury Trials in a Mass Media Age’, lecture given by Virginia Bell, 
Justice of the High Court of Australia, at the Supreme and Federal Court Judges Conference, January 
2005, www.ipc.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_speech_bell_270105 
(accessed 20 December 2013). 
Page 73 of 136 
 
would be a contempt of court’.312 This would provide a protective tool to deal with internet 
based prejudicial publications, which would makes Smartt’s claims far too radical, as this 
reform would allow for a far more practical and measured approach. However, Cram has 
critiqued this proposal, as it ‘ignores the practical problem that arises when those deemed to 
have ‘sufficient control’ are physically located outside the jurisdiction and that if those 
outside the jurisdiction ignore UK court orders this would lead to the courts’ authority being 
undermined’.313 
 
The Law Commission has also followed the Australian approach ‘that a person who has been 
sworn as a juror in a criminal trial must not inquire about the defendant until the trial is 
over. "Inquire" is defined as including "(a) search an electronic database for information, for 
example, by using the internet; and (b) cause someone else to inquire". The prohibition is 
backed by criminal sanctions, including the possibility of imprisonment’. 314  The Law 
Commission have recommended ‘the introduction of a new statutory offence of sworn jurors 
in a case deliberately searching for extraneous information related to the case’,315 ‘as there is 
a limit to how far restrictions on the media can legitimately address a problem such as this. 
There also needs to be clear restrictions on jurors’ conduct’. 316  The Law Commission 
‘recommend that this offence should be triable in indictment, with a jury in the usual manner. 
The maximum penalty for the offence should be 2 years imprisonment and/or an unlimited 
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fine’.317 Thus, the domestic approach is clearly adopting a neutralising stance to tackling 
prejudicial or impeding internet publications, as any prosecution will be focused on the juror 
rather than that of the offending publisher. Therefore, this can be seen as a further movement 
towards the US approach which as discussed earlier, focuses entirely on a neutralising 
approach to contempt, which is not as strong as the protective approach. 
 
These recommendations have seen Parliamentary support in s.71 and s.72 of the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Bill which criminalises ‘research by jurors’ and ‘sharing research with 
other jurors’. Both sections are amendments to the current Juries Act 1974, and add in the 
additional offence ‘a member of the jury that tries an issue in a case before a court to research 
the case during the trial period’,318 with the mens rea requiring intent or reasonableness in 
their knowledge of its relevance.
319
 Additionally, s.72 makes it an offence to share this 
information with other jurors; with both offences being punishable with imprisonment of up 
to two years. Thus, these amendments clearly uphold the Commission’s proposals on how to 
best tackle the thus far unacknowledged private research conducted by jurors,
320
 as ‘private 
research by jurors poses a threat to the fairness of our adversarial system of criminal jury trial 
by admitting into jurors’ deliberations material whose relevance to proceedings has been 
neither judicially determined nor subject to examination by counsel’.321 Consequently, this 
‘will impress upon jurors the seriousness of trying the case solely upon the evidence 
presented in court’322 and as such they should be less likely to encounter any prejudicial or 
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impeding publications.  Thus, it could be a logical conclusion, that this new offence will be 
used as a further tool to increasing the standard required to show that a publication has caused 
a substantial risk of serious prejudice under s.2(2), as a juror member is even less likely to 
have encountered the publication in question due to this neutralising tool. 
 
However, this neutralising approach must be met with heavy criticism, as Thomas argues that 
the ‘proposed new statutory offences and powers are ill-judged, unnecessary and likely to be 
un-workable in practice’.323  This argument can be sustained by the fact that in terms of 
dealing with contempt of court through prejudicial publications, it is wholly unreasonable to 
criminalise the juror member that reads the article, when the publisher is most likely to 
escape any liability at all. This approach moves the law strongly away from the protective 
approach and into a neutralising approach, which this work cannot support, as it is not the 
most effective theoretical model for dealing with contempt. Furthermore, Thomas points to 
the lack of any empirical support, as ‘there is no evidence that merely establishing these 
statutory offences will have any discernible impact on juror behaviour’,324 thus highlighting 
that the perceived benefit of a neutralising approach is often overstated. This argument is 
supported by Cram, as he forwards the potential situation ‘that jurors 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 have all 
done private research that they dare not acknowledge for fear of prosecution but which 
affects their respective approaches to the evidence. In this scenario, not only will the 
reasoning process in the jury room appear decidedly bizarre to other, law-abiding jurors, over 
time the offence may be thought likely to fall into disrepute because of its regular breach (and 
knowledge of this fact)’.325 Therefore, there is a real risk that this proposed law will fail to 
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actually neutralise any prejudicial publications from having an effect on a juror that has read 
the material. Yet, this law may be used by the judiciary to make the standard for s.2(2) even 
harder to reach, by claims that the jury integrity will be that much stronger, as the proposed 
laws will reduce the likelihood of them reading the publication in question. However, in 
reality, it will allow prejudicial publications to escape liability and place too higher burden on 
a flawed neutralising approach;
326
 therefore a far stronger protective approach needs to be 
developed. 
 
Nonetheless, tackling internet based prejudicial publications with a purely protective 
approach has been shown by this work to be an almost impossible task, due to its vast 
uncontrollable breadth. Thus the Law Commission’s recommendations provide a practical 
approach to the issue of the internet and encompass a mix of preventive and neutralising 
strategies as well: ‘the recommendations include greater education in schools about the role 
and importance of jury service; improving the information provided to jurors about their 
obligations during jury service; changes to the wording of the juror oath to include an 
agreement to base the verdict only on the evidence heard in court; requiring jurors to sign a 
written declaration; informing jurors about asking questions during the trial; a statutory 
power for judges to remove internet-enabled devices from jurors where necessary and 
effective systems for jurors to report concerns’.327  Therefore, in regards to tackling new 
media, any change will come predominantly in neutralising and preventive approaches, 
which is likely to be the most effective combination. 
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Furthermore, the Law Commission has been extremely reasoned in acknowledging that ‘there 
is the risk that, despite a new criminal offence being created and made known to every juror, 
some sworn jurors will fail to comply’.328 Therefore, this shows a marked acceptance, that 
jury integrity is not fool proof,
329
 which this work has already shown. Consequently, they 
accept that ‘in some cases temporary removal of material may be necessary’;330 in support of 
this they cite the extreme case of Maninder Pal Singh Kohli who faced charges in England of 
rape and murder but fled to India. When in India awaiting extradition he confessed to the 
crimes in a TV interview. At his trial in England, Mr Kohli claimed that his confession was 
unreliable as it was obtained by oppression in India. The trial judge excluded the confession 
and it was not presented as evidence to the jury. However, a curious juror searching for 
information about the trial would have immediately discovered this most prejudicial material 
in the form of the YouTube video of his confession.
331
 Accordingly, The Law Commission 
has taken a fairly balanced approach to dealing with modern media, by taking approaches 
from all three models of contempt law; however, Spencer has criticised the laws tackling the 
jurors themselves, as ‘it would discourage disclosure by jurors of their own or others 
misconduct’.332 Therefore, this would result in any prejudicial or impeding influences from 
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being exposed, thus damaging the fair trial process, which the laws were there to uphold. 
Furthermore, they failed to fully define the scope of the effect that social media is having on 
this area of contempt, and instead have left the law to be developed and fleshed out by the 
judiciary;
333
 which seems rather dangerous considering the lack of appreciation an aging 
judiciary will have for these modern developments. Nevertheless, this can be viewed as 
heading in the right direction, yet a full conclusion cannot be made regarding The Law 
Commission’s proposals on ‘substantial risk’, as their full findings and proposals have yet to 
be published.
334
 
 
Finally, concern has also been raised over the ability of the Attorney General to determine 
which publication has individually caused the ‘substantial risk’, as ‘in reality, the risk of 
prejudice arises most frequently from the cumulative (whether “snowball” or “drip-feed”) 
effect of publicity decisions taken by editors over a period of time, possible in a number of 
independent newspapers, not typically from single articles or broadcasts which are unlikely to 
be recalled specifically by jurors several months later’.335 As Fenwick points out, ‘amidst a 
mass of sensationalist, partial reporting, it is very difficult to ascribe responsibility to 
individual newspapers’. 336  Furthermore, Miller notes that ‘the combined effect of such 
coverage has created a substantial prejudice and yet, when judged at the time of publication, 
be unclear that any single publication has done so’.337 Yet, ‘it is difficult to see how contempt 
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laws can, or should, be adjusted so as to impose liability’;338 this could be achieved through a 
collective prosecution of publications which equally contribute to the substantial risk.  
However, the Commission at present are not willing to move forward with this development, 
as ‘liability cannot be founded on the collective impact of publicity, that is to say, where 
different publishers cumulatively create a substantial risk of serious prejudice or impediment, 
but where no individual publisher, taken alone, does so’.339 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the term ‘substantial risk’ as used in s. 2(2) of the Contempt of 
Court Act 1981. It has looked at its initial interpretation by the court; yet, in the lead up, 
inception and usage of the Human Rights Act 1998 the meaning has been distorted into 
creation of a much higher test. Therefore, an ambiguity has been created surrounding its 
meaning and usage; this has led to the English model moving away from a protective 
approach and towards an over- usage of the neutralising model. Furthermore, the English law 
is now in the ironic position of having gone too far in its attempts to adhere to the ECHR’s 
decision in Sunday Times, as it clearly does not match the approaches taken in ECHR 
jurisprudence. The chapter has also explored the empirical research that has been done 
regarding pre-trial publicity, which has shown that a lot of the arguments supporting the 
current English approach are based on judicial myths and do not match the results of the 
research. Additionally, attention was paid to ‘modern media’ and how this has impacted on 
the meaning and usage of ‘substantial risk’; yet its effects have not been satisfactorily dealt 
with by the English judiciary or Parliament.  
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Finally, it explored the potential areas of reform, which currently are unlikely to be achieved 
through a s.3 HRA reinterpretation of the current English law, so that the ‘substantial risk’ 
test can be read down to be in line with Worm; which would firmly place English contempt 
law back into the protective model. This is the preferred option of this thesis, as it would 
strengthen the existing laws and make sure the approach was firmly within the remit of the 
protective model, which would ensure an equal balance between freedom of expression and 
the right to a fair trial. Instead, reform is likely to come from legislative reform as a result of 
the Law Commission Proposals, yet it is doubtful whether these reforms will move contempt 
law back into the protective model and in line with Strasbourg’s jurisprudence. It is more 
likely to be a heavier reliance on neutralising models rather than the protective model, as the 
Law Commission’s proposals are filled with neutralising approaches (which have been 
discussed in this chapter). Nonetheless, such an approach is unlikely to fully tackle the 
problem and will leave the right to a fair trial under protected, as is a common problem with a 
heavy reliance on a neutralising approach; consequently, a far more protective approach 
would be favoured with a reduced reliance on neutralising measures when tackling the 
new/social media. 
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Chapter 5: ‘Seriously Prejudiced’ and the use of ‘Impeded’ 
This chapter will explore the judicial interpretation and usage of ‘seriously impeded or 
prejudiced’, which as has already been noted must be proven alongside ‘substantial risk’ as 
part of a two limbed test.
340
 The chapter will explore the following matters: firstly, the 
judicial interpretation of serious prejudice and the lack of clear separation from the meaning 
of impediment. Secondly, it will consider the extent to which more recent case law has shown 
a clear shift towards the separate use of serious impediment, and will consider how this will 
impact on the use and application of the s. 2(2) test. Finally, with the aid of the Commission’s 
recent consultation paper, it will assess the potential reform of the ‘seriously impeded or 
prejudiced’ test. 
 
Judicial interpretations of ‘seriously impeded or prejudiced’ 
Miller has noted that prejudice and its seriousness are concerned with the effect it would have 
on the outcome of a trial,
341
 which Fenwick has observed ‘can be established in a number of 
ways’.342 Thus, in sharp contrast to the unclear case law for the ‘substantial risk’ test, there 
are some clear standards, as Goldberg states that ‘the revelation of previous convictions is 
probably the classic teaching example to journalists about what one must not do’343 if they 
want to avoid creating a ‘substantial prejudice’ under s. 2(2). Furthermore, this assertion is 
clearly supported in the English case law, as in Attorney General v Independent Television 
News Ltd
344
 a publication of the defendants previous convictions were enough to give rise to 
serious prejudice. In support, Buxton J stated that ‘in this case, if even one juror at Mr 
                                                          
340
 A-G v News Group Newspapers [1987] 1 QB 1; [1986]  3 WLR 65. 
341
 C. Miller, Contempt of Court  (2000, Oxford), p232. 
342
 H. Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights 4
th
 edn (2007), p349. 
343
 D. Goldberg, G. Sutter & I. Walden, Media Law and Practice OUP (2009), p117. 
344
 [1995] 2 All E.R. 370; [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 204. 
Page 82 of 136 
 
Magee’s trial for a terrorist murder had in mind Mr Magee’s criminal record, and more 
particularly his previous conviction for an IRA terrorist murder, the effect on the course of 
justice in those proceedings would without doubt be serious’.345 Therefore, there is a clear 
standard that an inclusion of a previous conviction in a publication will give rise to a 
substantial prejudice; however, Cram is doubtful over what the word ‘serious’ adds to the 
standard, as ‘the word serious adds little if the test is taken as whole. If there is a risk of 
prejudice then it must be neutralised, and if it cannot be neutralised by standard directions 
then that risk becomes real or significant’.346 
 
Despite these apprehensions, the judicial standards for serious prejudice have remained on 
the whole clear and consistent, as ‘the potential prejudice must be serious, an ordinary 
English word which must be given its proper weight’.347 Thus, in A-G v Unger Simon Brown 
LJ found that articles which clearly imputed guilt would give rise to serious prejudice, as they 
could influence the jurors.
348
 Similarly, Quinn has supported this as an unambiguous and 
steady area of the law, as suggesting someone’s guilt is an ‘obvious area over which care 
must be taken’.349 In addition, this was similarly reasoned in A-G v Guardian as the article 
made claims that ‘there is a conspicuous hint of the necrophilia about this defendant’,350 they 
went on to draw links between the defendant and the notorious serial killers of Dennis Nilsen 
and Rosemary West. Thus, the court noted that there had been clear assertions that he had 
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instincts of a serial killer; consequently, the suggestion of his guilt was clearly seriously 
prejudicial.
351
 Therefore, Goldberg has noted from these cases it can be ascertained that an 
article which is ‘inaccurate, inflammatory, attributed motives to the defendants which formed 
part of the proper deliberation of the case’352 would give rise to ‘serious prejudice’.353 
 
Equally, case law has been comprehensible and followed for publications that have 
descriptions or photographs of a defendant where identity is likely to be an issue at trial, as 
this will give rise to serious prejudice. In Attorney General v Express Newspapers Ltd
354
 
there was an alleged gang rape by a group of footballers, where the victim did not know the 
names of the accused. The police and the Attorney General issued guidelines on a number of 
occasions, making clear that identity was an issue in the criminal proceedings and suspects 
should not be named or photographs of them published. On 10 October 2003, the Daily Star 
published an article giving the names of two of the accused and the clubs for which they 
played; thus, this was sufficient to meet the test for ‘serious prejudice’. More recently, 
photographs of the defendant in online publications have met the ‘serious prejudice’ standard, 
as it was noted that ‘visual images are designed for impact; that is why any editor would be 
keen to use them to add to the impact of the news story…. The image of the accused 
brandishing the pistol and apparently doing so in a brazen manner could not have failed to 
create an adverse impression of a young man who enjoyed demonstrating a propensity for 
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violence. It was prejudicial in a manner directly relevant to the issues in the case. 
355
  Thus, 
the fact that these photos were ‘improperly affecting the course of proceedings’356 equated to 
serious prejudice. Therefore, it can be concluded that the case law surrounding serious 
prejudice holds some clear standards: that referring to previous convictions, imputing guilt, 
releasing identities of the accused, and the use of photographs can all give rise to serious 
prejudice. 
 
However, there is an apparent merging of the concepts of prejudice and impediment, as the 
Law Commission has noted that
357
 - ‘it has been held that impeding and prejudice are neither 
mutually exclusive nor synonymous concepts, although they overlap’.358 Therefore, having 
the potential to blur the lines between the two concepts which would lead to inconsistent case 
law, as (has been discussed earlier in this work) the test for substantial risk for serious 
impediment is prima facie lower than that for serious prejudice. Furthermore, confusion can 
be created by the judges mistaking serious prejudice for a serious impediment and vice versa: 
an early example of this can be seen in Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd and 
Others.
359
 The case was a clear example of smearing the defendant’s character to cast 
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aspersions of guilt, as there was a ‘huge wave of media publicity’360 in which they showed 
the defendant to be feckless, a drug addict and involved in a homosexual affair. Oliver LJ 
observed that the publication ‘was fortissimo and it was lurid as the pettiness of the material 
permitted. Any idea that while a man has a criminal charge outstanding against him his 
character is in baulk was thrown to the wind’.361  Therefore, this shows that defamatory 
remarks which questioned the moral character of a defendant could give rise to serious 
prejudice.  
 
Nevertheless, confusion is created by his remarks that stated ‘the course of justice is not just 
concerned with the outcome of proceedings. It is concerned with the whole process of the law, 
including the freedom of a person accused of a crime to elect, so far as the law permits him to 
do so, the mode of trial which he prefers and to conduct his defence in the way which seems 
best to him and to his advisers. Any extraneous factor or external pressure which impedes or 
restricts that election or that conduct, or which impels a person so accused to adopt the course 
in the conduct of his own defence which he does not wish to adopt, deprives him to an extent 
of the freedom of choice which the law confers upon him and is, in my judgement, not only 
prejudice but a serious prejudice.’362 Thus, although his remarks refer to instances of serious 
prejudice, they are clearly instances of impediment, as they involve ‘matters affecting the 
conduct of the trial, including options open to the parties’.363 Consequently, there is a clear 
confusion within the judiciary as to where the line is between the concepts, which is 
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unsatisfactory, as ‘although there is considerable overlap between the ‘impediment’ and 
‘prejudice’ aspects of s. 2(2), their focus is somewhat different’.364 
 
Recent usage of serious impediment: removing the blurred lines? 
The ambiguous blurred line between impediment and prejudice is a view similarly shared by 
Sutter, as he notes that ‘in practice, the boundary between impediment and prejudice seems 
fluid’.365 Furthermore, these concerns were reiterated by the Law Commission as they stated 
their ‘concern that there is a lack of clarity generally about the meanings of “prejudice” and 
“impede” and the relationship between the two terms. The case law often refers to both 
prejudice and impediment in the same breath, without differentiating between the two’.366 
Thus, it can be ascertained that there is some confusion within the judiciary over the 
interpretation and implementation of prejudice and impediment. 
 
However, more recent case law has shown a clear movement by the judiciary to keep 
impediment and prejudice as two separate concepts and remove the blurred lines. In Attorney 
General v Random House Group Ltd
367
 the case concerned the retrial of those suspected of 
attempting to blow up planes using explosives in concealed soft drinks. A book had been 
published shortly before the trial which covered the case over 5 pages, yet an injunction was 
sought; consequently, the book was withdrawn.  It was noted that ‘the passing of time would 
fade memories of the coverage, and the judicial instructions would actively stop any juror 
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going out of their way to read the book; thus not a substantial risk for serious prejudice’.368 
Nonetheless, although it failed the s. 2(2) tests in this regard, an alternative approach could be 
taken, as ‘If the book were put back on sale the trial would be seriously impeded , as there 
would be multiple applications for a stay in the proceedings, and the trial judge would be 
distracted from his summing up’.369 Thus, in this case, it could be shown that the publication 
would have impeded the smooth running of the trial process, and thus could meet the test for 
serious impediment. Although, this is clearly a major restriction on freedom of expression, 
the court stressed that ‘the public interest in the trial being fair could not be higher. If they are 
innocent and found guilty the scale of injustice would be difficult to exaggerate. If they are 
guilty and have their proceedings set aside and not retried again then the injustice and risk to 
the public can not be exaggerated’. 370 Therefore, the findings in the case can clearly be seen 
to separate prejudice and impediment into two distinct categories, as impediment will look at 
whether the build up to the trial or the trial itself has been impeded. Consequently, it is 
distinct from serious prejudice, and will not be as hard to meet, due to the fade factor having 
little effect on impediment. 
 
Eady J has defined the use of the word impeded as making ‘it clear that if a publication is 
likely to have the effect of slowing down the stream of justice, or of diverting its flow even 
temporarily, that may in itself be treated as ‘undesirable’ as a matter of public policy and 
punishable as contempt. It does not appear to be necessary to go so far as to demonstrate that 
the conduct is likely to affect the outcome of the proceedings’.371 Thus, (as has been stated 
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already in this work) serious impediment does not need to reach such a higher test under 
substantial risk as the one needed for showing that the serious prejudice is a substantial risk. 
This approach is clearly taken
372
 in Attorney General v MGN
373
 in which ‘they (the media) 
systemically deconstructed his (the defendant’s) personality and imbued it with all manner of 
sinister and lurid undertones that were not only entirely false but deflected attention away 
from the real killer’.374 
 
The case involved Mr Jefferies, who on the 30 December 2010 was arrested on suspicion of 
murder; as a matter of fact he was innocent, yet this was not known at the time. A publication 
by the Daily Mirror a day after his arrest contained coverage of: ‘Jo suspect is a peeping 
Tom’; ‘friends in jail for paedophile crimes’; ‘cops now probe 36 – years old murder’;375 
‘fellow teacher abused boys in flat’; ‘he was strange, always hanging about’; ‘1974 strangler 
never caught’; ‘haunting similarities to the unsolved killing of a student teacher nearby in 
1974’; ‘police refused to rule out a link between the two killings’.376  Thus, this clearly 
created the impression that he was guilty of additional crimes, which undoubtedly smeared 
his character similar to the instances seen in Times and Guardian. Equally lurid coverage was 
reported in The Sun on the 1
st
 January 2011: ‘obsessed by death – Mr Jefferies scared kids by 
a macabre fascination’; ‘academic obsession with death’; ‘he let himself into the flat 
whenever he wanted as he had a key’; ‘murdered Jo suspect followed me says woman’; ‘I 
didn’t think his behaviour was normal’; ‘Hannibal Lecter – posh and a little bit creepy’.377 
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The Daily Mirror’s coverage on the 1st January 2001 went as far as saying: that the killer 
must have been waiting inside the flat; there were no signs of a break in; Mr Jefferies had 
access to her flat; Miss Yeates may have been killed after finding an intruder in her flat who 
did not want to be indentified later.
378
 Therefore, it can be observed that there was clear 
inference of guilt, similar to that of the damning publication in Unger. 
 
However, as has been the case for many other publications in regards to the unworkable and 
extremely high substantial risk test for serious prejudice, it failed to meet the high bar set, as 
‘anything read at the time by anyone who would in due course become a member of the jury 
which would try Mr Jefferies (assuming that the case had proceeded to trial) would have 
faded from the memory, and that taken with the appropriate judicial directions, the trial 
would have proceeded in the usual way and the jury would have returned unbiased 
verdicts’.379 Thus, there was not enough of a substantial risk to show that serious prejudice 
could happen, despite the articles vilifying Mr Jefferies.
380
 Nevertheless, the judiciary were 
willing to use impediment as a separate tool for brining an action under s. 2(2), despite them 
admitting it themselves that ‘the use of impeding the course of justice outside the trial process 
has been less well trodden’. 381  In support they cited Oliver LJ sentiments in Times 
Newspapers; although ‘at the end of the passage, (he) referred to prejudice, these are 
examples, but not a comprehensive list, of occasions when the course of justice would be 
impeded’. Thus, examples when serious impediment can be shown include: when the 
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publication influences the defendant or litigant to act in a particular way,
382
 or when the 
material would deter a witness from coming forward to give evidence.
 383
  
 
Thus, in terms of Mr Jefferies, the court stated that the ‘vilification of a suspect under arrest 
readily falls within the protective ambit of s. 2(2) of the Act as a potential impediment to the 
course of justice’.384 Therefore, the judges were not looking if the trial would be prejudiced 
and jury would not be able to reach a fair decision;
385
 instead, they were assessing if the 
evidence at the trial may be incomplete as witnesses were less likely to come forward. 
Consequently, the court found that this did amount to serious impediment, which Cram has 
praised for being a novel application of the law,
386
 as it clearly defines impediment under s. 
2(2) as being ‘established where an effective defence cannot be made out by the suspect 
because the nature of the publicity has the result that witnesses might be reluctant to come 
forward with relevant information’.387 However, it would seem that instances of this will be 
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rare and it is yet to be seen whether this will be followed by the judiciary; nonetheless, Agate 
has heralded the decision for clearly defining impediment and for making it clear to the press 
that the ‘Attorney General is quite prepared to bring proceedings, turning what has always 
been a serious consideration for publishers into a very live risk’.388 Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the English courts more recently have made a marked attempt to remove the 
blurred line between prejudice and impediment, in an attempt to create two separate and 
workable tests under s. 2(2). 
 
 Reform: creating two distinct standards 
In light of the Jefferies case, Grey has argued for the need of reform, as ‘the coverage 
illustrated just how inconsequential the media believed the contempt laws to be’.389 Further 
support has been given to this argument by Agate, as it ‘may well be time to see changes to 
the contempt regime’ in light of recent lurid news coverage. The Law Commission in their 
recent consultation paper have raised concerns over the recent Jefferies decision, as ‘the issue 
of whether the publications created a substantial risk of serious impediments appears to have 
emerged mainly at the hearing, with the respondents having previously proceeded on the 
basis that they were being accused of creating a substantial risk of serious prejudice. This 
meant it was harder for those media organisations to understand the case against them. We, 
therefore, consider that there is a risk that media organisations may be disadvantaged by the 
confusion between the two tests’.390 Therefore, there is still a grave concern that the line 
between impediment and prejudice is still too blurred and fluid, as to create confusion under s. 
                                                          
388
 J. Agate, ‘Strict enforcement of strict liability contempt’ (2012) Ent. L.R. 12. 
389
 S. Grey, ‘The World Wide Web: Life Blood for the Public or Poison for the Jury?’ (2011) 3 J.M.L. 
199, p207. 
390
 Law Commission, ‘Contempt of Court, A Consultation Paper’ (2013) Consultation Paper No 209, 
p17. 
Page 92 of 136 
 
2(2). Furthermore, there is the suggestion that as the law currently stands you could be 
accused of a serious impediment or prejudice in the same breath, which leads to ambiguous 
precedents, as well as not allowing the media to build a defence; hence, this is clearly an 
unsatisfactory situation. 
 
The court itself in Jefferies did admit that ‘impeding the course of justice and prejudicing the 
course of justice are not synonymous concepts. If they were, they would have been identified 
as distinct features of the strict liability’.391 Thus, there is still apparent confusion between the 
two concepts as to whether they are separate or not, even though the decision in Jefferies did 
prima facie separate the two concepts. Consequently, The Commission suggests that for the 
sake of clarity they should be represented as distinct issues in the law, allowing the publisher 
greater clarity as to what his/her liability might be and therefore allowing for a more effective 
response.
392
 Accordingly, this would create two distinct areas of jurisprudence for 
impediment and prejudice, which would aid in making the law less ambiguous and 
strengthening the protective approach that the English laws are meant to propagate. 
 
Grey has also called for reform in regards to whether the negative publicity might increase 
the chances that the guilty person might escape justice, as the notion does not fall within the 
current Act; consequently, this would require further legislation.
393
 Furthermore, Agate has 
supported this line of reform by claiming ‘the legislature may wish to consider amending the 
current contempt laws to prevent a defendant using earlier publicity surrounding another 
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individual to create reasonable doubt at trial’.394 Despite the academic support for reform in 
regards to this, as of yet, the Law Commission Report has not addressed these issues despite 
the apparently undesirable situation they cause. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the judicial interpretation and usage of ‘seriously impeded or 
prejudiced’. Firstly, it looked at the judicial interpretation of serious prejudice and that 
although there are some clear established principles, there is a lack of apparent separation 
from the meaning of impediment. Secondly, it considered the way that more recent case law 
has shown a clear shift towards the separate use of serious impediment; which has impacted 
on the use and application of the s. 2(2) test, in an attempt to make it more workable in light 
of the extremely high substantial risk standard for serious prejudice. Finally, it considered the 
way that reform in this area is primarily looking at separating prejudice and impediment into 
creating two separate distinct areas of jurisprudence in an attempt to strengthen the protective 
model. This is the favoured approach, as ensuring that the laws are still applicable and 
workable is a fundamental of the protective approach, as the law must work as a deterrent to 
ensure the protective model is effective. Thus by ensuring that impediment and prejudice are 
kept as two distinct and workable tests would ensure that the law is firmly within the 
protective approach, which is the best way of ensuring a strong balance between the right to a 
fair trial and freedom of expression. 
 
 
 
                                                          
394
 J. Agate, ‘Strict enforcement of strict liability contempt’ (2012) Ent. L.R. 12. 
 
Page 94 of 136 
 
Chapter 6: The use of s.5 (A discussion in good faith of public affairs) 
This chapter will assess the use of s. 5 under the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which 
provides a qualification to the strict liability rule under s. 2. Firstly, the chapter will explore 
the way the court’s liberal interpretation and usage of the terms ‘discussion in good faith’ and 
‘merely incidental’ in certain cases has allowed some unclear standards to develop. Secondly, 
it will be argued that as the law currently stands under the protective model, it is not fit for 
purpose, nor can it be conclusively stated that it is compliant with the ECHR. Finally, the 
chapter will weigh up the potential for reform with the aid of the Law Commission’s recent 
consultation paper. 
 
Interpretation and usage of s. 5 
Lowe has claimed that ‘the most striking aspect of s. 5 is that it allows publications that 
create a substantial risk of serious prejudice to escape liability’.395 However, the use of s. 5 is 
viewed as extremely important, as it ensures ‘that there can be a discussion of a matter of 
public interest despite the fact there are active proceedings’; 396  thus, s. 5 is seen as a 
‘significant safeguard for freedom of expression under ECHR Article 10. 397  Hence, s. 5 
appears to be a further safeguard by the legislators to ensure that the act is convention 
compliant and that there is not a repeat of the Times case. Accordingly, if the Attorney 
General can show that the extremely high standard of s. 2(2) is fulfilled, he/she must next 
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seek to establish that s. 5 does not apply;
398
 therefore, the burden is on the prosecution to 
show that the section does not apply once the respondent has met the evidential burden.
 399
 
 
S. 5 states that ‘a publication made as or part of a discussion in good faith of public affairs or 
other matters of general public interest is not to be treated as a contempt of court under the 
strict liability rule if the risk of impediment or prejudice to particular legal proceedings is 
merely incidental to the discussion’. The section contains several nebulous and subjective 
terms such as: ‘public interest’, ‘discussion’, and ‘merely incidental’; which the Law 
Commission claims have been interpreted liberally, from assessing the case law under s. 5.
400
 
Similarly, Goldberg has also reached this conclusion, which he argues is due to the wide and 
broad definitions being afforded by the domestic judiciary.
401
 Thus, it can be clearly 
ascertained that s. 5 has been liberally used in practice, as a way of further upholding and 
safeguarding Article 10 rights. 
 
Furthermore, this argument is clearly sustained when close attention is paid to the case law 
under s. 5. The term ‘discussion’ has been given a fairly wide definition, 402 as Lord Diplock 
noted in English (this case is generally considered to provide a good example of the kind of 
case for which s. 5 was framed)
403
 that an article which referred to a doctor charged with 
murdering a baby, would be ‘emasculated into a mere contribution to a purely hypothetical 
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debate’ if it didn’t contain said reference. Thus, it can be concluded that a ‘discussion’ can 
contain direct references to an active case; furthermore, ‘the discussion can be triggered off 
by the cases itself.
404
  Although a liberal interpretation of the law, Roberts has praised the 
decision, as had a narrow interpretation been given, all debate in the media surrounding the 
subject matter of the article in English (mercy killings) would have been stifled during the 
active period (which in this case would have been over a year).
405
 
 
In Attorney General v Times Newspapers
406
 the meaning of ‘public affairs’  had to be 
something that was a matter of general public concern; thus a discussion on the queen’s 
safety was sufficient, even if it did include extremely defamatory remarks about Fagin (the 
accused). However, in contrast, the Sunday Time’s allegation that Fagin had stabbed his 
stepson could not fall within in s. 5, as it was irrelevant to the question of the Queen’s safety, 
yet had been considered throughout the article. Therefore, it can be seen that the term ‘public 
affair’ can be used quite broadly and will protect fairly damaging remarks; nonetheless, those 
remarks must be relevant to the matter of the general public concern that is being discussed. 
Similarly, where a piece merely discusses a particular case and makes no attempt to address a 
wider public issue, s. 5 will clearly be inapplicable.
407
 Nevertheless, it must be concluded that 
the term a “discussion in good faith of public affairs or other matters of general public 
interest” has received quite a broad interpretation in the courts.408 
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Secondly, the court must ascertain: ‘is the risk of impediment to the trial which they create 
merely incidental to that discussion?’409 Aldridge similarly follows this test by stating it is 
‘whether the risk created was merely an incidental consequence to the expounding of the 
main theme of the publication’.410 Thus, it does not need to be ascertained whether ‘the 
article could have been written without the potentially prejudicial parts’,411 hence, allowing 
for a more liberal reading. Nonetheless, in Attorney-General v TVS Television Ltd
412
 it was 
held necessary to look at the subject matter of the discussion and to see how closely it related 
to the proceedings; consequently, the closer the relationship, the greater the risk. In this case 
the s. 5 defence failed because it was held that the risk of prejudice to the impending trial was 
not merely incidental to the public discussion, as the programme focused solely on the 
specific area and topic of the case (Landlords in Reading involved in fraudulent activities). 
However, in A-G v Guardian Newspapers the example was no more than ‘an incidental 
consequence of expounding the main theme of the article’; 413  thus, s. 5 was satisfied. 
Therefore, it can be seen that this element of s. 5 is fairly subjective, in that it allows a lot of 
discretion to be given to the judiciary on the particular facts of the case, as ‘the law must 
make assumptions about its likely impact’. 414  Thus, in an attempt to remain ECHR- 
compliant and quash a repeat of Sunday Times the judiciary have been fairly liberal with their 
interpretation and usage of s. 5. Consequently, it cannot be said that s. 5 is entirely clear in its 
wording or usage; nor is it applied consistently. 
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ECHR-Compatibility and ineffectiveness. 
Fenwick has noted that s. 5 is extremely out of place under the supposed domestic protective 
model for contempt, as s. 5 may be viewed as based impliedly on the assumption that the 
prejudice would have to be dealt with by the adoption of neutralising measures in relation to 
trials, and it is only by taking that possibility into account that s. 5 can be viewed as 
compatible with Article 6.
415
 Thus, s. 5 implies an acceptance of the neutralising approach to 
contempt, as it allows for a substantial risk of serious prejudice or impediment to occur. 
Hence, the only way to then ensure a fair trial is for neutralising measures to be imposed. 
Consequently, it is shown again that although masquerading as a protective model approach, 
the 1981 Contempt of Court Act is filled with neutralising elements. Furthermore, given that 
the s. 2(2) test requires such a high threshold to be met, it seems difficult to comprehend that 
the risk of prejudice is merely incidental to the article. Fenwick argues it is not impossible, as 
‘where the thrust of the discussion could not be said to cause prejudice, while the part which 
could was capable of being viewed as incidental to the rest’.416 However, this does leave an 
extremely ambiguous and unclear situation, which would not be consistently applied by the 
judiciary due to its subjective nature. 
 
Fenwick has further critiqued s. 5, ‘as a measure intended to protect media freedom, it might 
be expected to be capable of differentiating between two types of prejudicial publications – 
those consisting of inaccurate, misleading coverage of forthcoming proceedings and those 
that concern a general issue of public interest where the proceedings are generally used as an 
example.’417 However, in light of TVS Television it can be seen that this is not the case, as no 
regard was paid to the public interest value of the speech in question. Cram is similarly 
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critical of this issue, as he notes that the court ‘must make a determination as to the 
contribution of the publication to the public interest, which may involve some analysis as to 
the value of the speech in question.
418
 However, at present, s. 5 clearly fails to do this, as it 
does not provide an opportunity for the weighing up of the seriousness of the prejudice 
against the significance of the speech in question; thus, ‘the courts are being asked to engage 
in literary as opposed to legal analysis’.419 The value of the speech in question plays a large 
role in Strasbourg jurisprudence, with political expression being given the highest protection 
(Jersild v Denmark),
420
 followed by artistic expression (Otto-Preminger v Austria),
421
 then 
entertainment expression (Scherer v Switzerland),
422
 and finally the lowest value is given to 
advertising expression (X and Church of Scientology v Sweden).
423
 Nevertheless, at present 
Strasbourg appears to have had little influence in the interpretation and usage of s. 5, which is 
troubling considering that s. 5 is a measure intended to further strengthen Article 10 rights 
and thus avoid any conflict with Strasbourg. 
 
Phillipson is also critical of the stance that s. 5 allows, as ‘although media freedom should be 
strongly upheld when the media is carrying out its proper function in a democracy, when it is 
not doing so, and particularly when it is attacking the basic freedoms of others, courts should 
not hesitate to rein it in’.424 Thus, this argument would suggest that s. 5 has no place in 
English contempt law, as it allows for publications that prejudice and impede the right to a 
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fair trial in the name of upholding freedom of expression, yet clearly in these situations this 
Article 10 right need not be upheld (Worm). However, Dworkin’s moral autonomy argument 
‘supports the right to freedom of speech in order to prevent unpopular points of view from 
being silenced because state actors or majorities find them distasteful or offensive’. 425 
Nevertheless, this theoretical approach is not valid for this situation as ‘a prohibition upon the 
reporting of highly prejudicial facts… is not premised upon governmental dislike or contempt 
for certain viewpoints, nor is it an attempt to suppress the development of certain ideologies, 
or to deprive the citizen of information about the justice system’.426 Thus, any suppression is 
based on the protective model approach to upholding the right to a fair trial; hence, any use of 
s. 5 undermines this, and as mentioned previously – places the law into a neutralising 
approach, which is far less effective. Therefore, in order to uphold Dworkin’s argument for 
‘equal concern and respect’ s. 5 usage appears highly problematic. Consequently, s. 5 may 
not be in line with the ECHR, because a public interest defence cannot operate where a 
publication imperils the right to a fair trial.
427
 Furthermore, article 6 must necessarily take 
primacy over the exercise of article 10 rights.
428
 Thus, the current interpretation and usage of 
s. 5 does not fall within the remit of the protective model. 
 
Reform 
Despite these concerns, the Law Commission have taken the stance that s. 5 ‘strikes the 
appropriate balance between ensuring the right to a fair trial, whilst also permitting the media 
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to report on important matters of public concern’. 429 However, Cram argues that s. 5 ‘should 
be revisited with a view, at least, to offering some clarification as to its ambit’;430 thus, in the 
most basic of clarifications, there should be a judicial acceptance that the measure is reliant 
on neutralising measures, and as such they should be considered when s. 5 is being applied. 
However, the Law Commission has instead focused on the importance that the courts ‘weigh 
up Article 6 and Article 10 when deciding whether the risk of impeding or prejudiced 
proceedings is incidental to the public interest value of the discussion.’ 431 Thus, the Law 
Commission seems less concerned with the need for drastic reform to s. 5. 
 
Nevertheless, Fenwick has been much more vocal about the opportunities to reform s. 5, in 
order to make it fit for purpose under a protective approach for contempt of court law. Firstly, 
she has argued that ‘the problematic term incidental could only be stretched so far, and if the 
courts were to seek to adopt a proportionality test within the terms of s. 5, they would have to 
be prepared to depart from the literal meaning of the section and read words into it.’432 Thus, 
the reading into the law of a proportionality test would allow for the merit of the speech to be 
assessed, which would draw the case law much closer to that of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
In light of post-HRA judicial decisions, it may very well be the case
433
 that the judiciary 
could and would read such a test into the statute in order to make it more ECHR-complaint. 
Fenwick states that this would be achieved by a court reading in the words – ‘if the 
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proportionality test under Article 10(2) is not satisfied, or – after the word if’.434 Therefore, if 
there was a judicial acceptance that as the law stands parliament had failed in its attempts to 
achieve Convention compliance, then this could be possible, as such a reform is a matter of 
interpretation rather than implying a new provision, which the judiciary are far more 
comfortable doing.
435
 Furthermore, the matter in question is one of protecting the judicial 
process, which the judiciary appear to be far more willing to use their s. 3 HRA right for.
436
 
However, in light of the Law Commission’s consultation paper, the law is currently in more 
of a Bellinger
437
 situation, where the judiciary will wait for parliament to legislate and reform 
this area, even if suitable changes do not happen to s. 5, as the judiciary have shown no 
inclination to use s. 3 in this way. 
 
Consequently, it would appear that any potential reform in this area will be a lot more 
restrictive than the radical re-interpretation that Fenwick has called for. Instead, the Law 
Commission has taken a far more generalised approach to the concerns expressed, as ‘cases 
involving section 5 are relatively rare, perhaps because the Attorney General chooses not to 
proceed in cases where there is a reasonable argument that the section would apply. Greater 
clarity in respect of this could be gleaned if the Attorney General were to publish a 
prosecution policy’.438 Cram has supported this move, as ‘It would also provide much needed 
clarity as to the scope of s. 5 and the factors relevant to the public interest, providing 
publishers with greater certainty as to when it would apply. The absence of clarity is likely to 
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produce a chill on comment’.439 Thus, it is apparent, that reform is far more likely to come in 
the form of clearer guidelines on how and when s. 5 will be used in an attempt to remove 
ambiguity and improve transparency to the public, while also increasing consistency between 
the Attorney General, and the judges. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed the use of s. 5 under the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which 
provides a qualification to the strict liability rule under s. 2. Firstly, the chapter explored the 
way that the court’s liberal interpretation and usage of the terms ‘discussion in good faith’ 
and ‘merely incidental’ in certain cases has allowed some unclear standards to develop, as the 
tests are far too subjective. Secondly, it has shown that as the law currently stands under the 
protective model, it is not fit for purpose, nor can it be conclusively stated that it is compliant 
with the ECHR. This is due to the over reliance on neutralising measures and a lack of 
willingness to do a proportionality test while assessing the value of the speech. This over 
reliance on the neutralising approach is not favourable and must be addressed through reform 
so that it has a far heavier reliance on the protective model. Finally, the chapter explored the 
potential for radical reform in this area, to make it fit for purpose under a protective model 
approach, which is the favoured approach of this thesis. However, in light of the recent Law 
Commission consultation paper, it would seem that a far more restrictive approach to reform 
is likely to be taken in this area. Thus, the law under s. 5 is likely to remain more heavily 
within the neutralising approach, yet instead s. 5 should encompass a proportionality test and 
be more readily used by the courts so as to ensure that it is firmly placed within the protective 
model. 
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Chapter 7: Common Law Contempt 
This chapter will explore the jurisprudence on common law contempt under English law, and 
its usage alongside the statutory provisions under the Contempt of Court Act 1981. Firstly, 
the chapter will give a brief overview of common law contempt as it currently stands under 
English law. Secondly, it will evaluate the meaning of imminence under common law 
contempt, while contrasting this to the active period seen in the Contempt of Court Act 1981: 
it will highlight some key areas of concern with its definition. Thirdly, it will assess its usage 
for bringing actions under: creating prejudice, pressuring litigants, and frustrating the aim of 
an injunction. From this it will note compatibility issues common law contempt has with the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Finally, it will look at the potential for reform in this 
area, and what form this will most likely take. 
 
Overview of Common Law Contempt 
Under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 a narrow area of the common law contempt was left 
by s. 6(c), thus ‘the act does not render the common law irrelevant’.440 The remaining narrow 
area made it that it is now a crime of specific intent, rather than basic or general intent, as per 
the recommendations of the Phillimore Committee.
441
 Consequently, as Lord Donaldson 
notes - ‘I am quite satisfied that… what is saved by s. 6(c) of the 1981 Act is the power of the 
court to commit for contempt where the conduct complained of is specifically intended to 
impeded or prejudice the administration of justice. Such an intent need not be expressly 
avowed or admitted, but can be inferred from all the circumstances, including the 
foreseeability of the consequences of the conduct’.442 Therefore, the conduct element of the 
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offence is concerned with the interference of the administration of justice,
443
 and the mens 
rea element is concerned with whether the defendant ‘intended to impede or prejudice the 
administration of justice’.444 Thus, Common law contempt by publication requires proof of 
intention to prejudice proceedings, although there are ambiguities about this
445
 and other 
aspects of the law
446
 (which will be discussed throughout this chapter).  Additionally, from a 
theoretical approach, it is important to note that ‘Common law contempt – like strict liability 
contempt – is not based on the preventive approach since it is unconcerned with the question 
whether prejudice has actually been caused’; 447  furthermore, ‘the need to show intent 
precludes the emergence of the incidental preventive effect’.448 Thus, common law contempt 
is firmly attempting to be within the protective model. 
 
Moreover, Arlidge has hypothesised that ‘common law contempt is more expansive than 
statutory contempt on the basis that it could apply’ 449  to: private communications, for 
example a letter to a witness pressuring them to give evidence; to creating a risk of serious 
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prejudice which is less than substantial but more than minimal;
450
 to creating a risk of 
prejudice which is less than serious, although not to technical contempt as this would be 
ECHR compliant;
451
 to proceedings which are inactive within the terms of the 1981 Act but 
which are pending;
452
 to proceedings which can be said to be imminent in that they are 
virtually certain to take place but have not yet begun,
453
 although this may be difficult to 
reconcile with the ECHR requirements of articles 7 and 10. It is unclear whether contempt 
can occur in respect of proceedings which are ‘on the cards’ but not yet virtually certain to 
happen; and finally, to potential appeal proceedings in the period between trial and appeal. 
Thus, it can be ascertained that common law contempt can be applied to a plethora of 
situations; nonetheless, the Law Commission has noted that ‘it is rarely invoked’454  and 
Goldberg has concluded that ‘common law contempt is famously protean’.455 Similarly, this 
has been supported by Fenwick, as she notes that ‘its role… is now far more limited than the 
role of the strict liability rule due to the requirement of intent’.456 
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The meaning of imminence 
However, ‘if the requirement of intent can be satisfied, it is then easier to establish contempt 
at common law rather than under the Act since it is only necessary to show ‘a real risk of 
prejudice’, and proceedings need only be imminent, not ‘active’. There is also no common 
law equivalent of s. 5’. 457  Nonetheless, the meaning of ‘imminence’ is riddled with 
ambiguities and clashing approaches from the judiciary, which has left the jurisprudence in 
an unsatisfactory position. The original position was that the sub judice period began when 
proceedings could be said to be imminent;
458
 yet this is clearly less well defined than the clear 
guidelines presented in Schedule 2 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. Miller has been 
similarly critical of the position, as it ‘seems at best unsatisfactory… because of the doubts as 
to the stage in the criminal process at which the residual common law of contempt begins to 
bite’.459 
 
This ambiguity is only further added to when account is taken of the judge’s obiter comments 
in A-G v News Group Newspapers plc.
460
 It was noted in the obiter comments that where it 
established that the defendant intended to prejudice proceedings, it is not necessary to show 
that the proceedings are imminent, as Watkins LJ stated that: ‘no authority states that 
common law contempt cannot be committed where proceedings cannot be said to be 
imminent but where there is specific intent to impede a fair trial, the occurrence of which is in 
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contemplation’.461 Whereas, in A-G v Sport462 Hodgson J considered that proceedings must 
be pending. He interpreted pending as synonymous with active, despite Bingham LJ agreeing 
with the previous dilution of the imminence test. Thus, this leaves the ‘imminence’ test with 
two contradicting approaches, which is clearly not a satisfactory situation. Miller has gone as 
far to say that ‘the overall position may be found to conflict with Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in as much as doubts as to its scope may mean that it is not 
‘prescribed by law’.463 This argument can be sustained, as Strasbourg will find a violation 
where the law is too ‘unclear’ and ‘vague’, as was seen in Hashman and Harrup v UK464 
where the measure in question  failed the ‘prescribed by law’ test. Therefore, considering that 
the media is without a clear guide as to when a publication may be at risk during the 
‘imminence’ period, such a violation could logically be found by Strasbourg, as the ‘test of 
imminence is itself too wide and uncertain’.465 
 
Creating Prejudice and Pressuring Litigants 
Despite the concerns regarding the lack of clarity around ‘imminence’, common law 
contempt can be used when cases fall outside of the scope of the 1981 Act, as they do not fall 
within the active period. This is aptly shown by A-G v News Group Newspapers plc
466
 where 
Dr B was questioned regarding a rape allegation by an 8 year old girl; however, due to 
insufficient evidence, they were unable to prosecute him. The Sun obtained the story and 
decided that they would offer the mother financial support to fund a private prosecution. 
They published several vilifying articles: ‘Rape Case Doc: Sun acts’, ‘Beast must be named, 
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says MO’, yet as he was not under arrest anymore, there was no active period. Nonetheless, 
common law intention for contempt can be established, as it’s foreseeable that these articles 
would bias the upcoming trial they were funding. Notwithstanding its usefulness in this 
matter, Miller has been heavily critical of the decision, as ‘it is at best messy and may also be 
dangerous to use the common law to outflank the Act. Certainly, the decision introduces an 
element of uncertainty into what is already an area of the law which causes considerable 
problems for editors and their legal advisors’.467  
 
Thus, as was seen with the imminence test, there is also a large amount of doubt over the 
clarity of this standard, and as to whether it would meet the ‘prescribed by law’ standard at 
Strasbourg. However, this could be an unnecessary point to be concerned with, as Fenwick 
has heavily questioned its application any more, due to no other cases having happened since 
1991 on the reliance of this strand of common law contempt; thus, it can be seen as a ‘dead 
letter’.468  This is due to it now being hard to satisfy s. 2(2) of the 1981 Act unless a 
publication occurs close to or during the trial, which makes it hard to imagine an instance in 
which it would be useful to invoke the test of imminence – if a publication was merely 
imminent as opposed to active it would not satisfy the ‘real risk of prejudice’ test under the 
more recent s. 2(2) rulings on the creation of risk.
469
 This has been similarly supported by 
Cram, who has concluded that ‘In reality, such a scenario is unlikely to arise – if it’s not 
captured by the Act as it’s not active, it is unlikely to satisfy substantial risk’.470 Therefore, it 
can be concluded that this area of common law contempt is almost completely redundant and 
should not be viewed as a usable avenue under common law contempt. 
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However, a more useful strand of common law contempt can be classed as that of pressuring 
a litigant,
471
 as it was stated in Sunday Times
472
 that ‘to seek to dissuade a litigant from 
prosecuting or defending proceedings by threats of unlawful action, by abuse, by 
misrepresentation of the nature of the proceedings or the circumstances out of which they 
arose and such like – is no doubt a contempt of court’.473 Similar issues to this arose in 
Hislop
474
 where defamation proceedings had been instituted by Mrs Sutcliffe, wife of the 
notorious ‘Yorkshire Ripper’, against the satirical magazine, Private Eye. In response to this 
they published further articles alleging that Mrs Sutcliffe had lied to the police to protect her 
husband and defrauded the social security authorities. Additionally, they suggested that she 
would be cross-examined on these matters if she carried on pursuing the defamation 
proceedings against them. The court upheld the contempt action on the basis that ‘when 
parliament addressed the question of contempt of court in 1981, it expressly preserved 
liability for contempt in respect of conduct which was intended to prejudice the 
administration of justice, irrespective of whether the proceedings were active or not: s. 6(c) of 
the Contempt of Court Act 1981. The fact that Mr Hislop believed the allegations he made 
against Mrs Sutcliffe were true, and the further fact that if sued for libel he intended to plead 
justification as a defence, cannot justify publication of the allegations when the purpose was 
to put pressure on Mrs Sutcliffe and deter her from pursuing her existing action to trial’.475  
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Consequently, ‘by publishing libels, intending to deter another party to litigation from 
pursuing her claim, they had given rise to a substantial risk that the course of justice would be 
impeded, as it was likely that a litigant might be put off’.476 Fenwick has approved of the 
decision and its future application, as ‘it represents a clear and quite precisely defined area of 
liability targeted at a particular mischief’.477 Therefore, unlike much of the other case law 
discussed thus far, this sets a clear standard and would meet the ‘prescribed by law’ test at 
Strasbourg. Consequently, it is an area of common law contempt that is both ECHR 
compliant and one that could still be used readily today. 
 
Frustrating the Aim of an Injunction 
Attention must be given to a ‘very significant special form of common law contempt’,478 
which ‘can arise if part of the media frustrates a court order (including orders made under s. 
4(2) of the 1981 Act)’.479 ‘A controversial example is accorded by the liability of the Sunday 
Times and Independent newspapers in the famous Spycatcher case’.480 A-G v Newspaper 
Publishing Plc (Spycatcher case)
481
 involved the Attorney General in 1985 commencing 
proceedings in Australia in an attempt to restrain the publication of Spycatcher by Peter 
Wright. The book included allegations of illegal activity engaged in by MI5. The Guardian 
and The Observer had published a report of the forthcoming hearing with extracts from the 
book. Consequently, the Attorney General obtained temporary injunctions based on breach of 
confidence. However, during the time leading up to the injunction hearing The Independent 
and two other publishers released material covered by them. As a result they were liable for 
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common law contempt, as they frustrated the aim of the injunction. Furthermore, this was 
confirmed by the House of Lords (A-G v Times Newspapers Ltd),
482
 as it concluded that such 
publications constituted the actus reus of common law contempt on the basis that publication 
of confidential material, the subject matter of a pending action, damaging its confidentiality 
and thereby probably rendering the action pointless, created an interference with the 
administration of justice. 
 
Therefore, ‘the House of Lords ruled that a non-party who knowingly frustrates an injunction 
may be punished for interference with the administration of justice’.483 Although the case is 
seemingly logical and clear law, it undoubtedly ‘created an inroad into the general principle 
that a court order should only affect the party to which it is directed at’.484 This is similarly 
supported by Feldman who noted that Spycatcher has ‘the effect of extending the effect of an 
injunction far beyond the people to whom the injunction is addressed’.485 Furthermore, he 
concludes that it should be ‘a cause for concern, as third parties who are liable to be punished 
for contempt for breaching the injunction would not have been able to appear before the court 
to oppose the grant of the injunction’.486  Therefore, it can be said to have the effect of 
creating a ‘chilling effect’ on the media, as an injunction against one publisher, is actually a 
ban on all publications, which clearly runs against the grain of the Strasbourg decision in 
Sunday Times.
487
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However, the decision in A-G v Newspaper Publishing plc and Others
488
 seemed to represent 
an attempt to narrow down the area of liability created by the decision in Spycatcher. The 
court noted that they ‘should be slow to extend the law any further since any extension 
represented a further encroachment on freedom of expression and inhibited the media in its 
function of informing the public’.489 Furthermore, they went as far to say that they ‘did not 
accept that any conduct by a third party inconsistent with a court order was sufficient to 
amount to the actus reus of contempt – it was found necessary to show that a significant and 
adverse effect on the administration of justice in the relevant proceedings had occurred’.490 
Therefore, this highlights a marked attempt by the court to make sure that the common law 
does not infringe too far upon Article 10 rights, by clearly making sure that any restriction is 
necessary and proportionate. This is echoed by their statement that ‘restraints upon freedom 
of expression should be no wider than are truly necessary in a democratic society, we do not 
accept that conduct by a third party which is inconsistent with a court order in only a trivial or 
technical way should expose a party to conviction for contempt’.491 Consequently, this aided 
in drawing this strand of common law contempt into line with Strasbourg principles. 
 
Nevertheless, this narrowing and appreciation of Strasbourg principles was seemingly short 
lived, as A-G v Punch
492
 re-affirmed in Spycatcher. The case involved a former MI5 worker 
who had confidential information published in the Mail on Sunday and Evening Standard in 
1997. There was an interim injunction bought against this material in 1997 on breach of 
confidence, which was to last until the trial for this action. However, the MI5 worker wrote 
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an article for Punch disclosing some of this information, which the editor was fully aware of. 
The Court of Appeal
493
 concluded that the purpose in granting the injunctions was for 
national security – the injunction was ‘to prevent the disclosure of any matter that arguably 
risked harming the national interest’.494 Therefore, as the material published in Punch did not 
do this, no common law contempt could be found, as they did not frustrate the purpose of the 
injunction. They noted that any other approach would allow the Attorney General to censor 
newspapers and that it would be disproportionate to any public interest and thus in violation 
of Article 10.
495
 Therefore, the Court of Appeal was taking a strong regard for the principles 
of necessity and proportionality, so as to align the position with a Strasbourg approach. 
 
Conversely, the House of Lords rejected this approach.
496
 They noted that the underlying 
purpose was irrelevant (which is a complete reversal to what the Court of Appeal stated), as 
‘the purpose the court seeks to achieve by granting the interlocutory injunction is that, 
pending a decision by the court on the claims in the proceedings, the restrained acts shall not 
be done. Third parties are in contempt of court if they wilfully interfere with the 
administration of justice by thwarting the achievement of this purpose in the proceedings. 
This is so, even if in the particular case, the injunction is drawn in seemingly over-wide 
terms’.497 Therefore, the Lords clearly endorsed the far wider approach taken by Punch, 
which is clearly less Article 10 friendly. Furthermore, they went on to say that ‘the purpose of 
the judge making such an order was to preserve the confidentiality of the information 
specified in the order pending the trial so as to enable the court at trial to adjudicate 
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effectively on the disputed issues of confidentiality arising in the action’ and that ‘he must 
have been aware that this information would precisely breach the confidentiality of this 
information’.498 Consequently, they were found liable for common law contempt, as they had 
frustrated the aim of an injunction. 
 
This decision has been met with fierce criticism, as the ‘consideration of the impact of the 
HRA was brief and superficial’.499 The closest the House of Lords came to appreciating the 
influence of the HRA was when they stated that ‘sanctions are necessary to maintain the rule 
of law; in the language of the Convention, to maintain the authority of the judiciary’.500 As 
such, Fenwick’s critique appears fully justified, as she notes that ‘the analysis did not address 
the questions of necessity and proportionality; it implied that once a court had decided that 
material should be kept confidential before the trial of a permanent injunction and had 
imposed an interim injunction with that object in mind, it would always be justifiable to 
restrict freedom of expression by way of common law contempt in order to provide a 
sanction against publication of the material by third parties where publication would have a 
significant and adverse effect on the administration of justice in the trial’.501 Consequently, 
the court clearly failed to appreciate proportionality, as breach of the interim injunction 
addressed to the specific publisher would only result in a civil action, whereas the mass of 
other publishers would be criminally liable; thus, the doctrine clearly creates a chilling effect 
on the media, which is grossly disproportionate to the aim pursued. Furthermore, the court 
clearly failed to take regard of the HRA and in particular s. 12(4) HRA, which is wholly 
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misjudged considering the impact these pieces of legislation have had on the interpretation of 
s. 2(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.  
 
Additionally, the House of Lords implied that assessing proportionality was not necessary at 
all, when they stated that ‘National security is one of the reasons, set out in the familiar list in 
article 10(2) of the Convention, which may justify a restraint on freedom of expression. The 
interests of national security may furnish a compelling reason for preventing disclosure of 
information about the work of the Security Service’.502 This is clearly a ‘Superficial approach 
to Article 10’,503 as they have taken the exceptions under Article 10(2) to mean that they have 
free will to impinge this right. Thus, the House of Lords clearly failed to uphold s. 2 HRA 
and acknowledge Strasbourg jurisprudence, as there was no mention of the value of the 
speech in question, which plays a pivotal role in the ECtHR’s decision making process.504 
 
These concerns have been similarly shared by Devonshire, as he notes that ‘Obviously this 
revives concerns as to a form of liability that extends to non-parties and its implications for 
freedom of expression in general, and freedom of the press in particular’.505 Furthermore, it 
‘creates an element of uncertainty as to when the actus reus of contempt has been committed. 
How can parties be expected to assess the legality of their conduct short of seeking directions 
from the court’?506 Therefore, the law is clearly in a position where it does not uphold the 
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rights of Article 10 strongly enough, as the whole area is cast with an air of uncertainly as to 
when an action would be bought. Feldman is also critical of this, as ‘such an extension of the 
effect of injunctions beyond their proper limits by the procedural sidewind of contempt 
proceedings against a third party should not be permitted’.507 Therefore, it must be concluded 
that ‘Punch is one of the most disappointing rulings there has been so far under the HRA: it 
represents a judicial acquiescence to executive’s predilection for secrecy, coupled with a 
determination to cling to anti-speech values reflected in common law doctrine even when 
they fly in the face of Convention principles’.508 Consequently, this area of common law 
contempt is in great need of reform. 
 
Reform 
This chapter has clearly highlighted that there are several concerns surrounding Common 
Law contempt; as Miller notes, ‘In English law there is a continuing role for the common law 
in the area of sub judice contempts. However, this still leaves a number of difficult issues to 
be resolved’.509 Furthermore, ‘the more uncertain the test becomes, the more, it is argued, 
common law contempt is divorced from a focus on such fairness’;510 as it fails to uphold 
either Article 6 or Article 10 rights. As such it is in need of radical reform, to guarantee its 
effective use under the protective model and to ensure that it is ECHR compliant. 
 
Firstly, Fenwick has called for the abolition of creating bias under common law contempt, as 
it ‘seems to be serving no useful purpose, since it overlaps with the use of the strict liability 
                                                          
507
 D. Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2002, 2
nd
 edn, OUP), p. 974. 
508
 H Fenwick and G Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (2006) p 301. 
509
 C. Miller, Contempt of Court  (2000, Oxford),  p. 287. 
510
 Ibid. 
Page 118 of 136 
 
rule, and should be abolished’.511 Whereas, in contrast, the limb that deals with pressuring a 
litigant should ‘be viewed as a special form of contempt and placed on a new statutory 
basis’.512 Both these recommendations are extremely plausible, as the creating bias form of 
common law contempt has become nebulous and unworkable, yet pressuring a litigant has 
allowed for a niche area of protection when certain special facts arise. Therefore, the limb of 
creating bias should be officially abolished to clear up any ambiguity, and the law regarding 
pressuring a litigant should be fully endorsed and placed on a statutory footing alongside the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981. This has been similarly supported by Feldman, as he has argued 
that ‘reform by statute would be welcome’. 513  However, in light of the more recent 
developments surrounding the use of ‘impediment’ (which have been previously discussed), 
it could be argued that the pressuring of a litigant during the active period would be covered 
under s. 2(2). Nonetheless, this would only cover the active period, yet the decision in Hislop 
expressly concluded that any impediment to the administration of justice should be 
prosecuted. As such this stream of common law should be placed on a statutory footing as per 
Fenwick and Feldman’s recommendations. 
 
Miller has also called for this, as ‘development in line with the statute would ensure ECHR 
compliance’, 514  thus, ensuring that the ‘imminence test’ is drawn into a much clearer 
statutory definition, so that it can be said to be ‘prescribed by law’. It could be argued that if a 
suitable post-HRA case ever arises, it is possible that reinterpretation of this common law 
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doctrine as an aspect of the court’s duty under s. 6 HRA,515 might reintroduce certainty into 
the timing test. However, much greater certainty would be achieved by brining the common 
law into the statutory framework, which would remove any ambiguity. This has been 
supported by Cram: he concluded that ‘for reasons of clarity… contempt might be placed on 
a statutory footing’.516 Furthermore, by doing this, it would ensure that any further cases 
involving frustrating the aim of an injunction would have to take full appreciation of the 
HRA and the ECHR, thus ensuring that standards of necessity and proportionality are met. 
Additionally, this is the most likely path for reform, as although only touched on briefly in 
the Law Commission’s Consultation paper, they do note that they are considering whether the 
common law of intentional contempt by publication should be defined in statute;
517
 
consequently, this would address all of the aforementioned issues and ensure its effective 
usage under the domestic protective model for contempt. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the jurisprudence on common law contempt under English law, and 
its usage alongside the statutory provisions under the Contempt of Court Act 1981. Firstly, 
the chapter gave a brief overview of common law contempt as it currently stands under 
English law, which showed that there are several key issues surrounding nebulous terms and 
inconsistent applications of the law by the judiciary. Secondly, it evaluated the meaning of 
imminence under common law contempt, while contrasting this to the active period seen in 
the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which highlighted some key areas of concern with its 
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definition, as it is far too ambiguous and as a consequence unlikely to pass the ‘prescribed by 
law test’ at Strasbourg. Thirdly, it assessed its usage for bringing actions under: creating 
prejudice, pressuring litigants, and frustrating the aim of an injunction. It highlighted that 
creating prejudice is now a redundant limb and is in need of abolition, as it is far too 
restrictive on Article 10 and as is unusable. Whereas, pressuring a litigant is highly useful and 
should be drawn into the statutory framework, to ensure that it can be prosecuted both inside 
and outside the active period, as no publication should have the de facto right to alter the 
administration of justice. This is also the case with frustrating the aim of an injunction, as the 
case law currently fails to appreciate the HRA and ECHR, which would be done if placed on 
a statutory footing. Finally, it concluded that the most effective and most likely reform will 
come in the way of abolition and statutory legislation. Such reform would ensure that the law 
becomes far more defined and usable, which would place the law firmly within the protective 
model. Currently the law in this area is far too nebulous, and as such does not work as a 
deterrent which is a key fundamental for the success of the protective model. Thus, through 
abolition and precisely worded new legislation, a much more protective approach would be 
achieved, which is the favourable approach for contempt law, as it will ensure a fair balance 
between freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial. 
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Chapter 8: The Future of English Contempt of Court Law 
As the Philimore Committee concluded back in the 1970s, ‘the law relating to contempt of 
court has developed over the centuries as a means whereby the courts may act to prevent or 
punish conduct which tends to obstruct, prejudice or abuse the administration of justice either 
in relation to a particular case or generally’.518 This conclusion is something that the domestic 
law has endeavoured to maintain under a predominantly protective model, yet as the law 
currently stands it is in need of further reform to ensure it remains within the protective 
model, effective in an era of modern media, and ECHR-compliant. Furthermore, as this work 
has extensively looked at, the Law Commission’s recent consultation paper is to a certain 
extent attempting to address these matters.  
 
However, as this thesis has argued, the preferred model for contempt is a protective one, and 
as such reform in this area needs to ensure this. Yet many of the Commission’s proposals 
have left the law as it is or suggested minor changes which will leave the law more within a 
neutralising approach. This is sustained by Cram’s claim that the threshold test under s. 2(2) 
as it currently stands is ‘largely unworkable’;519 consequently, the law does not effectively 
maintain the media under a protective model, and leaves matters to be dealt with under a 
more neutralising approach. As such, ‘robust and nuanced jury directions have been, and 
continue to be developed to cater for developments in technology’;520 which the Commission 
and Parliament is clearly looking to continue with their strong focus on the criminalisation of 
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juror misconduct
521
 under s.71 and s.72 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill. Nonetheless, 
as Cram has noted ‘whilst such measures might ensure the safety of the trial they do not 
prevent the risk arising’, 522  which should be the fundamental foundation of the English 
approach to contempt law, so that it remains strongly within the effective protective model. 
Therefore, for the English protective approach to become effective, s. 2(2) must be brought in 
line with the standards set by Strasbourg jurisprudence, and in particular Worm. 
 
As has been said throughout this thesis, this can be achieved through a combination of 
reforms from the judiciary and parliament. The judiciary need to use their power under the 
HRA to read down s. 2(2) of the Contempt of Court Act, so that it is line with Strasbourg in 
Worm, and thereby create a more protective approach. This judicial reform needs to be 
carried through into their creation of two distinct standards for impediment and prejudice, 
which will consequently ensure that the law is far more effective and usable. This separation 
has been endorsed by the Law Commission,
523
 as by doing this the courts will ensure the 
Contempt of Court Act can work as a deterrent, which is fundamental for a protective model 
approach.  
 
Similarly, if a suitable case arises, the judges need to read a Strasbourg test of proportionality 
in to s. 5 of the Act, so that it remains usable and Convention compliant. Parliamentary 
reform would also provide a means of making these changes, which would be more 
satisfactory. However, disappointingly the Commission are less reluctant to read in such 
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radical reforms to the standard;
524
 instead opting for a clarification approach, where clear 
guidelines are issued as to its ambit. However, this will fail to take account of proportionality 
and it will not properly assess the competing Article 10 and Article 6 rights. Therefore, s. 5 
can be seen as too broad as it has the potential to stifle free speech, but also too narrow as the 
ambiguity to its scope makes it not readily usable by the judiciary.  
 
As mentioned previously in this work, reform also needs to come in the form of abolition of 
common law contempt, so as to remove the nebulous and unworkable tests which distort this 
area of contempt law. Thus, by ensuring clear and usable laws, common law contempt of 
court law will be firmly within the remits of the protective model. Many of these 
recommendations and others made throughout this work, have not been endorsed by the Law 
Commission themselves, thus, it unlikely that such a strong protective approach will be 
achieved within English law. Which Cram has argued is ‘essential’,525 as primacy must be 
given to the Article 6 rights for a fair trial over Article 10; thus ensuring an effective 
protective model for English contempt law. 
 
Furthermore, the Commission have still left some ambiguities in regards to the approach to 
be taken towards modern media, which this work has briefly touched on. They note that ‘in 
respect of contempt by publication and the impact of the modern media, we recommend that 
the definition of a publication “addressed to the public at large or any section of the public” 
under section 2(1) of the 1981 Act should not be amended. Although the definition is vague, 
particularly in relation to publications over social media (for instance those which are 
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available to only a limited number of “friends” or “followers”), we do not consider that a 
statutory or other definition would be practicable. We instead recommend that the law should 
be left to develop on a case-by-case basis, allowing for future changes to online means of 
communication’.526 Thus, the Law Commission has seemingly left the courts to decide this, 
which as has been mentioned previously, is wholly unreasonable, as a predominantly aging, 
white, middle class, and male filled judiciary is not equipped to deal with development in 
social media and the internet. Consequently, this will result in neutralising measures having 
to be deployed whenever there is a strong risk to the fair trial process, which will heavily 
detract from the far more effective protective approach. A much more reasonable approach 
would have been the recommendation of some practical guidelines, which are updated 
regularly. However, it is important to remember that these guidelines would not replace the 
need of judicial decisions; instead they must be seen a supplement that would help guide the 
judiciary as the modern media rapidly develops. Consequently, the media do not have to 
second guess what is, and what is not at risk of contempt; thus, the law could act as a true 
deterrent, which would ensure it encompassed a key element of the protective model. 
 
This issue is similarly bought up when they conclude that ‘assessing whether a person’s use 
of new media constitutes a communication to the public or a section of it will vary 
significantly both between the various media available and depending on how the particular 
service is used. Email, for example, would generally seem analogous to private 
correspondence. Social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, can involve 
communications to the world at large or to a limited number of “friends” or “followers” by 
the use of privacy settings. In such cases, it appears that whether a communication was to the 
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public or a section of it would need to be decided on a case-by-case basis’.527 Again this 
leaves the judiciary in charge of developing the law in an era of modern media. Therefore, 
considering they still place all the importance on the printed media and have thus far failed to 
acknowledge the monumental power of online media, it is an unsatisfactory position to be in. 
This argument has been similarly endorsed by Cram, as he notes that ‘without doubt… the 
current law relating to contempt… are ill-equipped for the demands of the new media 
landscape’;528 as such, reform needs to go above what the Law Commission has suggested 
thus far.  
 
Hence, as has been acknowledged in the previous chapters, the Law Commission has 
addressed some of the major issues, but it really seems to have failed to fully stamp down on 
the power of modern media. Instead the Commission is leaving the judiciary to develop the 
law, which is an unsatisfactory position for the law to be in, as it weakens the effectiveness of 
the protective model and places too much reliance on a neutralising stance. Nonetheless, the 
full findings from the Law Commission have yet to be published, which makes it difficult to 
fully assess the future of contempt law domestically. It can be said that the future of 
Contempt Law is moving in the right direction since the government has acknowledged that it 
needs to be reformed, yet it seems not to be doing quite enough to fully ensure that it remains 
within the protective model, effective in an era of modern media, and ECHR compliant. 
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Summary of Key Reforms that should be introduced 
The following reforms should be introduced to ensure that contempt of court law remains 
strongly within the effective protective model: 
1. The judiciary should use s. 3(1) HRA to change the interpretation of s. 2(2) to be 
more in line with that of the standard set by Strasbourg jurisprudence in Worm 
(likelier than not test). This would allow for more prosecutions, which would 
strengthen the protective model and detract from the need to rely on the neutralising 
model. However, if a suitable case does not arise for this to happen in the immediate 
future, this must then come in the form of legislative reform. 
2. Legislative reform is needed to give the judiciary the power to effectively raise 
injunctions against any online material which may alter the fair trial process. This 
would only be during the active period and would not be a permanent injunction. A 
more neutralising stance would have to be used when dealing with any material that 
falls outside the remit of the English jurisdiction. This would come in the form of 
strong judicial directions, juror interviews, and delaying the trial. Although not 
desirable under the protective model, these neutralising approaches will help support 
the overall protective approach. 
3. Legislative reform that will result in greater education in schools about the role and 
importance of jury service; improving the information provided to jurors about their 
obligations during jury service; changes to the wording of the juror oath to include an 
agreement to base the verdict only on the evidence heard in court; requiring jurors to 
sign a written declaration; informing jurors about asking questions during the trial; a 
statutory power for judges to remove internet-enabled devices from jurors where 
necessary; and effective systems for jurors to report concerns. 
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4. Legislative reform to allow for collective prosecution of publications where the 
combined contribution has achieved a substantial risk to the fair trial process. This 
would strengthen the protective approach, and demand far more responsible 
publications from the publishers. 
5. The judiciary should create two distinct areas of jurisprudence for impediment and 
prejudice, so as to create a clear set of standards which can be easily followed which 
would enable the law to be much more protective. If a suitable case does not arise to 
clearly define this in the immediate future, this must then come in the form of 
legislative reform. 
6. The judiciary should read a proportionality test into s. 5 so as to allow for an effective 
weighing up of the competing rights. If a suitable case does not arise to read in this 
proportionality test in the immediate future, this must then come in the form of 
legislative reform. 
7. The Attorney General should publish guidelines to the media as to the use of s. 5 and 
a clear set of definitions and standards as to when it will be used. 
8. Legislative abolition of common law contempt of court for creating bias and the 
legislative writing in of common law contempt for pressuring a litigant. 
9. The legislative removal of the imminence test under common law contempt and the 
introduction of a much clearer and workable word/definition. 
10. The Attorney General should publish guidelines to the judiciary about new social 
media and which forms are likely to be considered a publication, and what size the 
viewing figures will need to be, to be deemed a substantial risk. 
These recommendations would place English contempt of court law firmly within the 
protective model, which is the most effective model for ensuring that freedom of expression 
and the right to a fair trial are given equal consideration. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
The basis of this thesis was Lord Diplock’s statement that ‘Trial by newspaper or, as it should 
be more compendiously expressed today, trial by the media, is not to be permitted in this 
country’.529 From this, the work has shown the three main theoretical models that can be 
applied to do this, and shown that a combination of all three with a focus on the protective 
approach would be the most effective. This is the current approach that the English legal 
system has attempted to adopt within the Contempt of Court Act 1981, with the aim to 
uphold both Article 6 and Article 10 ECHR rights, to ensure Strasbourg compatibility. 
 
The strength of the protective approach was shown when contrasted to the purely neutralising 
model of the USA in which the right to fair trial and freedom of expression are not even 
acknowledged as clashing rights; consequently, nothing is done to curtail the media in any 
way. Subsequently, there is a heavy reliance on the judge’s ability ensure a fair trial with 
other measures, yet as was highlighted, this less desirable approach has led to some 
catastrophic cases of miscarriages of justice. Therefore, a far more protective approach must 
be seen as the suitable approach for domestic contempt law, especially in the internet era. 
 
However, the domestic reality has been shown to be far from this idealistic theoretical 
approach. The meaning of ‘substantial risk’ under s. 2(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 
has been driven to an extremely high threshold through a judicial fear of Strasbourg 
incompatibility and the inception of the HRA, when in fact the Strasbourg test is one of a 
lower standard. Resultantly, the protective model is weakened due to the Act not really 
posing a threat, which places a greater burden on the neutralising measures, which are far 
from fool proof. Furthermore, reform is likely to come from legislative reform, as a result of 
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the Law Commission proposals, yet it is doubtful whether these reforms will move contempt 
law sufficiently back into the protective model and in line with Strasbourg’s jurisprudence. 
As such, the current trajectory of s. 2(2) is not going far enough into the desired protective 
model, which would also ensure its compatibility with Strasbourg. 
 
Following on, this work looked at the judicial interpretation of serious prejudice and argued 
that although there are some clear established principles, there is a lack of apparent separation 
from the meaning of impediment. However, more recent case law has shown a clear shift 
towards the separate use of serious impediment, which has impacted on the use and 
application of the s. 2(2) test, in an attempt to make it more workable in light of the extremely 
high substantial risk standard for serious prejudice. Consequently, reform in this area is 
primarily looking at separating prejudice and impediment into creating two separate distinct 
areas of jurisprudence in an attempt to strengthen the protective model. The support from the 
Law Commission has shown that a clearly defined test for impediment would definitely help 
in moving English contempt law far more within the protective model, as the law could be 
more readily used and as such would act as a deterrent to publishers. 
 
Additionally, it assessed the use of s. 5 under the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which 
provides a qualification to the strict liability rule under s. 2. However, as the law currently 
stands under the protective model, it is not fit for purpose, nor can it be conclusively stated 
that it is compliant with the ECHR. This is due to the over-reliance on neutralising measures 
and a lack of willingness to do a proportionality test while assessing the value of the speech. 
Disappointingly, in light of the recent Law Commission consultation paper, it would seem 
that a far more restrictive approach to reform will be taken in this area, which will not fully 
address the issues. As such, it fails to meet the demands of the protective model, as s. 5 
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should be there to safeguard against the protective model going too far with its curtailing of 
the media, to the point of creating a chilling effect. Thus, for s. 5 to be effective within the 
protective ambit, it must be reformed to encompass the Strasbourg standards. 
 
Finally, the work looked at the narrow category of common law contempt, which still serves 
an important purpose under the protective model for domestic contempt law. There are three 
key distinct areas to the common law, which include: creating prejudice, pressuring litigants, 
and frustrating the aim of an injunction. However, creating prejudice is now a redundant limb 
and is in need of abolition, whereas pressuring a litigant is highly useful and should be drawn 
into the statutory framework. This is also the case with frustrating the aim of an injunction, as 
the case law currently fails to appreciate the HRA and ECHR, which would be done if placed 
on a statutory footing. Therefore, the most effective and most likely reform will come in the 
way of abolition and new legislation. Consequently, this would meet the protective model 
standards, as it would create a clear set of laws and guidelines for the publishers to follow, 
which would act as a true deterrent. 
 
Consequently, the thesis has explored from a theoretical approach, the key areas of contempt 
law that aim to restrict the media from altering the fair trial process. There are clearly several 
issues with the law as it stands currently, and rapid reform needs to occur in order to ensure 
that modern media and the internet do not destroy the protective model to the point where the 
domestic law can only function with a heavy reliance on neutralising measures. The work has 
appreciated the Law Commission’s proposals which do go some way to addressing these 
issues, and it is hoped that the remaining proposals, which are yet to be published, match the 
recommendations given by this work, as this would ensure that domestic contempt law 
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remains predominantly within the protective model, becomes effective in an era of modern 
media, and is compatible with Strasbourg. 
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